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Introduction
The study o f organizational culture is an interdisciplinary endeavor. 
Anthropology, sociology, communications, public administration, political science, 
economics, and business administration and their associated scientific paradigms have all 
collectively influenced the development o f  the construct ‘organizational culture.’ In the 
literature, organizational culture has been described as strong, weak, unique, general, 
unitary, comprised o f  subcultures, cognitive/ideational, behavioral, having been ‘co­
opted,’ dependent upon a leader or hero, a determinant o f behavior and decision making, 
a fad, something to be managed, something to be understood, something that is unto 
itself, or something that an organization has. It would require a Herculean effort to 
discuss each o f  these concepts in any detail. Instead, this paper will focus on the role o f 
organizational culture in influencing organizational behavior and decision making or 
choices. However, additional historical and theoretical considerations will be discussed 
in an effort to situate or provide the reader a frame o f reference for understanding the role 
o f organizational culture as an influence on behavior and choices.
Initially, a historical perspective on the development o f  organizational culture will 
be provided. This discussion will acquaint the reader with the ‘'story ' o f  organizational 
culture’s development. As such, organizational culture will be defined, several models o f 
organizational culture will be presented, the role o f subcultures in advancing the study o f 
culture will be discussed, and the prominent competing paradigms will be addressed. 
Following this, the emphasis o f the analysis will shift to organizational behavior.
M ultiple studies, representing the two predominant paradigms, will be discussed that will 
portray how behavior has been fundamentally influenced by organizational culture.
1
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Behavior or action is distinguishable from choices or decision making. The next focus o f 
the paper address decision-making theory and how culture and its manifestations 
(identification, symbols, politics/power) influence decision making by limiting the range 
o f  acceptable alternatives. Again, several studies in the literature will be used to support 
these assertions. Finally, a discussion will be provided that examines possibilities 
(paradigms, methodologies, domains o f interest) for future research in organizational 
culture.
W hat is Organizational Culture?
Whereas the term ‘culture’ had been prominent in the anthropology and sociology 
literature prior to the 1970s, it became popularized in the communication literature in the 
late 1970s and the mid-1980s (Pettigrew 1979; Smircich 1983; Frost et al. 1985; Yanow 
and Adams 2000). The rise o f  organizational culture studies has been viewed by some as 
a response or critique to positivism or functionalism and its associated ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, and methodology (Jelinek et al. 1983; Smircich 1985; Smircich 
and Calas 1987; Hatch 1997; Eisenberg and Riley 2001). Some o f the organizational 
culture literature (Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo 1982; Pacanowsky and 
O ’Donnell-Trujillo 1983; Ott 1989; Bantz 1993; Hatch 1993; Hatch 1997) advocated 
research, grounded within the interpretive worldview, which emphasized lived 
experiences in the ‘real’ world. However, at the same time, a competing view o f 
organizational culture was developing. This competing view o f  organizational culture 
has come to be known as ‘corporate’ culture. Corporate culture studies tend to adopt a 
functionalist or modem worldview (Burrell and Morgan 1979), in which culture is
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viewed as an independent or dependent variable that can be measured (Hofstede 1980; 
Ouchi 1981; Deal and Kennedy 1982; Smircich 1983; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983; Weick 
1985, Denison 1990). The origins o f  the organizational culture movement influenced 
early definitions o f organizational culture.
Pettigrew (1979:574) described culture as a “source o f a family o f  concepts.” The 
manifestations o f  culture he includes are symbol, language, ideology, belief, ritual, and 
myth. Pettigrew (1979:574) viewed symbol as the most inclusive category o f  culture and 
defines symbols as “objects, acts, relationships, or linguistic formations that stand 
ambiguously for a multiplicity o f meanings, evoke emotions, and impel men to action.” 
Baker (1980:8) defined organizational culture as an “interrelated set o f beliefs, shared by 
most o f  their members, about how people should behave at work and what tasks and 
goals are important.”
Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo (1982:120) took an even broader approach to 
defining organizational culture by “indicating that what constitutes the legitimate realm 
o f inquiry is everything that constitutes organizational life.” From a behavioral view they 
identified several communication activities that lend to sense-making (Eisenberg and 
Riley 1988) and ultimately serve as expressions o f  culture: relevant constructs, facts, 
practices, vocabulary, metaphors, stories, rites, and rituals. Mahler (1997) built on the 
notion o f sense-making and views culture as an influence that guides organizational 
learning. Acknowledging the role that ideology plays in organizations. Trice and Beyer 
(1984:654) noted, “the culture o f any social system arises from a network of shared 
ideologies.” Ideologies are defined as “shared, relatively coherently interrelated sets o f 
emotionally charged beliefs, values, and norms that bind some people together and help
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them make sense o f their worlds” (Trice and Beyer 1993:33). Accordingly, culture has
two basic components: 1) substance — networks o f  meanings that embody values, norms,
and ideologies; and 2) forms — expressions o f those values wherein they are
communicated to other members (Trice and Beyer 1984). Trice and Beyer (1993) also
made a point to define what culture is not. Accordingly, culture is not climate,
groupthink, social structure, metaphor, nor is it necessarily the key to success.
Ouchi and Williams (1985), Robbins (1986), Ott (1989), and Schein (1991, 1992)
all focused on the notion o f shared  understandings, meanings, and behaviors as basis for
defining organizational culture. Schein (1991:247) defined culture as the following:
a pattern o f shared basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group, as it leams to cope with its problems o f  external adaptation and 
internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and, 
therefore, is to be taught to new members o f the group as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.
For Schein (1992), the notion that culture was shared or held in common was crucial. He
identified ten phenomena associated with culture: 1) observed behavioral regularities
when people interact (language); 2) group norms; 3) espoused values; 4) formal
philosophy; 5) rules o f  the game; 6) climate; 7) embedded skills; 8) habits o f  thinking,
mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms; 9) shared meanings; and 10) root metaphors
or integrating symbols. Schein (1992:17) also proposed a model (Figure 1) for
uncovering three levels o f culture: 1) artifacts — visible organizational structures
(buildings, logos, dress, material objects, physical layout), behaviors (ceremonies, rites,
rituals, traditions/customs, rewards, punishment, processes) and language (anecdotes,
jokes, stories, myths, metaphors, jargon, explanations, rhetoric); 2) espoused values —
strategies, goals, and philosophies; and 3) basic assumptions — unconscious beliefs,
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thoughts, perceptions, and feelings that influence values. Adams (1993) identified three 
basic assumptions: 1) dependency — group dependent on the leader; 2) pairing — two 
members working together will produce something to benefit the group in the future; and
3) fight-flight -  the group is together to fight or retreat from a common enemy.
Figure 1. Levels o f  Culture (Schein 1992)
Assumptions
Artifacts
Espoused
Values
Ott (1989:1) further elaborated on previous definitions o f culture and stated, “It 
[culture] is the unseen and unobservable force that is always behind organizational 
activities that can be seen and observed.” Ott (1989) endorsed Schein's (1992) typology 
o f organizational culture composed o f three levels: 1) artifacts (observable behavioral 
patterns), 2) values and beliefs (what ought to be), and 3) basic underlying assumptions 
(spirit or truth taken for granted -  what is). This typology is useful for identifying 
methods for studying different components o f  culture (i.e., it is difficult to observe values 
and beliefs). Robbins (1986) described seven characteristics or expressions o f 
organizational culture: 1) individual autonomy, 2) structure, 3) support, 4) identity, 5) 
performance reward, 6) conflict tolerance, and 7) risk tolerance. Whereas taxonomies are 
useful to understand concepts, Robbins’ (1986) characteristics could likely be 
compressed into three characteristics: 1) behavior (influenced by degree o f autonomy.
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risk tolerance, and conflict tolerance), 2) identity, and 3) symbols (with rewards and 
structure being types o f  symbols).
Building on Schein’s (1992) model, Sackmann (1991) and Hatch (1993) proposed 
alternate models o f organizational culture. Sackmann (1991) raised concerns about the 
lack o f  research that had been conducted to assess cultural cognitions or beliefs that are 
not readily observable. In order to enable readers to better conceptualize cognitions, she 
proposed an ‘iceberg’ model o f  culture with a phenomenological orientation. With this 
model, she distinguished between 1) manifestations o f  culture that are observable as 
artifacts and behaviors at or above the surface levels, and 2) basic beliefs about priorities, 
processes, causes, and improvements that are commonly held, used, and emotionally 
anchored below the surface.
Hatch (1993) introduced the cultural dynamics model, in which she proposed a 
non-linear relationship between cultural components and distinguished symbols as a 
separate entity from artifacts (Schein 1992). While Schein (1992) and others have 
included symbols as artifacts. Hatch distinguishes symbols from artifacts because 
symbols have social meaning, while artifacts merely represent something. According to 
Hatch (1993:660-661), the dynamic model asks how culture is constituted by 
assumptions, values, artifacts, and symbols, while also recognizing both stability and 
change as potential outcomes o f the same cultural process. According to the model 
(Figure 2), assumptions are manifested as values, which are then realized as artifacts. 
Through symbolization, the artifacts are linked with meaning, which is then interpreted as 
social reality.
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Figure 2. The Cultural Dynamics M odel (Hatch 1993)
manifestations realization
interpretation symbolization
Values
Artifacts
Symbols
Assumptions
Organizational culture can best be summarized as a collection o f understandings 
shared by most members, which are influenced by assumptions, ideologies, values, and 
beliefs, and expressed as artifacts (symbols, identity, and behavior). Whereas some have 
described culture as a unitary or monolithic force characterized by the existence o f 
consensus (Deal and Kennedy 1982; Schein 1991, 1992), in the previous definition, I 
used to term “most” to indicate the multitude o f  cultures that can exist within an 
organization.
Subcultures
Cultures can be viewed as highly integrated, or highly disorganized with little 
cohesion. These two views need not be mutually exclusive, but instead can be described 
as a continuum of cultures or subcultures (Figure 3). Smircich (1983:346) alluded to the 
existence o f  subcultures when she raised concerns about trying to manage culture. She 
stated, “Much o f the literature refers to an organization culture, appearing to lose sight o f
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the great likelihood that there are multiple organization subcultures, or even
countercultures, competing to define the nature o f  situations within organizational
boundaries.” Van M aanen and Barley (1985) acknowledged the contribution of
anthropology and sociology to the study o f  culture, with anthropology viewing culture as
a unitary phenomenon, while the idea o f subcultures is largely a sociological construct.
Van Maanen and Barley (1985:38) defined subcultures as:
a subset o f an organization’s members who interact regularly with one another, 
identify themselves as a distinct group within the organization, share a set o f  
problems commonly defined to be the problems o f all, and routinely take action 
on the basis o f  collective understandings o f  the group.
Van Maanen and Barley (1985) identified six elements that can influence the 
development o f subcultures: 1) segmentation (technical rationality and its organizing 
strategies including professionalization, standardization, automation, specialization, and 
funtionalization); 2) importation (mergers and acquisitions); 3) technological innovation;
4) ideological differentiation; 5) contracultural movements (nonconformity with the 
group); and 6) career filters (hierarchical ranks or levels).
M ost researchers o f organizational subcultures have identified three distinct 
‘types’ o f  subcultures as they relate to the dominant culture. M artin and Siehl (1983) 
described subcultures as 1) enhancing (adhere to core values o f  dominant culture), 2) 
orthogonal (adopt core values, but develop separate consistent values) , and 3) counter- 
cultural (direct challenge to core values). Using a transaction cost approach, Jones 
(1983) identified three subcultures: 1) production culture (routine and standardized 
processes involved); 2) bureaucratic culture (non-routineness increases and process by 
which inputs are converted to outputs is obscure); and 3) professional culture (non­
routine and difficult work performed by specialized personnel). Hofstede (1998) utilized
8
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Jones’ (1983) theory o f subcultures and was successful in identifying the production 
culture (administrative personnel), the bureaucratic culture (customer interface), and the 
professional culture (management and specialized staff) within a large Danish insurance 
company. Golden (1992) distinguished between cultural subgroups by the degree with 
which individual action increases independent o f the organization. As such. Golden 
(1992) described three subcultures: homogeneous culture, heterogeneous culture, and 
ambiguous culture.
Martin (1992) further developed her earlier description o f organizational 
subcultures, by incorporating three social science perspectives in the study o f 
organizational culture: 1) integration — expressed as organization-wide consensus; 2) 
differentiation — consensus located in subcultures; and 3) fragmentation -  exemplified by 
ambiguity and the dynamic nature o f  consensus. Martin (1992) noted that while all three 
perspectives may be evident within any one culture, many researchers and organizational 
members choose not to cross the perspectives. In concluding remarks, Martin critiqued 
her own approach and suggested that a fourth perspective based on epistemology or 
methodology might also be appropriate. Denison (1996), too, was critical o f M artin’s 
perspectives for her failure to integrate the three perspectives and acknowledge that a 
singular phenomenon is being studied from three perspectives. The role o f  ontology and 
epistemology and their associated paradigms, as indicated by Martin (1992), has shaped 
and dramatically influenced the study o f  organizational culture.
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Figure 3:
A Continuum fo r  Describing a Culture’s State o f  Integration -  Differentiation
(Hatch 1997:226)
Unitary Integrated Differentiated Fragmented Disorganized
O Oo
o o
Competing Paradigms
As was previously noted, studies o f  organizational culture originated
simultaneously as a critique and endorsement o f the traditional functional worldview o f
science (Yanow and Adams 2000). According to Burrell and M organ (1979) and Hudson
and Ozanne (1988), the functionalist paradigm or worldview adopts an epistemology
(grounds o f knowledge) based on predicting and verifying regularities from causal
relationships. The observer gathers information and knowledge independent o f the
phenomena being observed. Ontologically speaking (nature o f reality), the functionalists
perceive a real world made up o f  hard and tangible truths. Whether or not they are
currently known or understood does not diminish their existence. The goals or axiology
o f the functionalist paradigm are typically to prove a priori hypotheses. The interpretive
paradigm adopts a subjectivist approach to the analysis o f the social world. According to
Burrell and Morgan (1979:28);
The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it 
is, to understand the fundamental nature o f  the social world at the level o f 
subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm o f individual 
consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame o f  reference o f the participant as
10
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opposed to the observer o f  action. In its approach to social science it tends to be 
nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic. It sees the world as an 
emergent social process which is created by the individuals concerned.
From an ontological perspective, reality is seen as being socially constructed (Berger and
Luckman 1967). Interpretivism is characterized by an epistemology in which the knower
and the known or the observer and the observed do not operate independent o f each other.
Knowledge is viewed as being subjective. Axiology is characterized by a desire to
understand, not predict social phenomena.
Martin (1985) has distinguished two camps o f cultural researchers: cultural
pragmatists and cultural purists. Cultural pragmatists, typically fall within the
functionalist paradigm, and view corporate culture as something an organization ‘has’
that should be managed by leaders to enhance productivity, profitability, efficiency and
commitment. According to Schein (1992:209), “ ...the unique function o f leadership that
distinguishes it from management and administration is this concern for culture. Leaders
create culture and, .. must manage and sometimes change culture.” Cultural purists
mostly associate themselves with the interpretive paradigm and believe that culture is
something that ‘is’ and cannot and should not be managed, but instead emerges from the
collective members o f the organization and represents their values and beliefs (Smircich
1983). Interpretive cultural researchers speak o f culture as “webs o f significance” spun
by man, symbols, and social constructions (Geertz 1973; Smircich 1985). Those who
have studied organizational culture (corporate culture) from the functionalist view — the
pragmatists — (Hofstede 1980; Ouchi 1981; Deal and Kennedy 1982; Wilkins and Ouchi
1983; Weick 1985, Denison 1990; GAO 1992; Schein 1992; Schein 1999) have tended
not to overly concern themselves with those researchers who have espoused the
11
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symbolic-interpretive framework for studying organizational culture (Pfeffer 1981; 
Jelinek et al. 1983; Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo 1983; Astley 1985; Smircich and 
Galas 1987; Hummel 1991; Hatch 1997; Eisenberg and Riley 2001).
However, there are those in the interpretive camp that have voiced concern that 
studies o f  organizational culture have been co-opted by those practitioners o f  corporate 
culture. Kunda (1993), as cited in Denison (1996:21), has pointed out that “thin 
description may be a more accurate description o f most field research on organizational 
culture.” Smircich and Galas (1987:229) were so concerned by this phenomenon that 
they stated:
The original impetus behind organizational culture was to counter the dry and 
overly rational form o f  traditional theorizing about organizations. It seems that 
now, however, organizational culture has been appropriated by the rational 
tradition. Thus to the extent that “culture” has been incorporated into the 
positivist, technical interst as part o f the “traditional organizational literature,” the 
organizational culture literature may be “dominant, but dead.”
Whereas Smircich and Galas (1987) provided little evidence to support their claims.
Barley et al. (1988) utilized quantitative analysis methods to show that academics have
come to adopt practitioners’ functionalist view o f  culture as the dominant framework.
According to Barley et al. (1988), published articles on organizational culture grew
exponentially beginning in 1982. Initially, most o f  those studies were completed by
practitioners; however, by 1984, the amount o f  publications by practitioners and
academics were equivalent. The convergence o f the data raises issues o f whether the
academics were influencing the practitioners or whether it is the other way around.
Barley et al. (1988:52-55) stated:
However, the data suggest that conceptual and symbolic influence flowed in only 
one direction; from practitioners to academics. Since the “economic value o f 
manipulating culture” and “rational control and differentiation” were themes that
12
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originated in the practitioners’ literature, it would appear that academics gradually 
adopted or accommodated to practitioners’ concerns.
.. .Similarly, one cannot decide from the data whether the convergence is to be 
welcomed or lamented. To the degree that this [organizational theory was 
concerned with issues troubling organizations] has occurred, they may indicate 
the field’s responsiveness rather than ease by which it was co-opted. Alternately, 
if  applied social sciences require basic social research as a fount o f knowledge (as 
is generally assumed to be true o f the hard sciences), then the results should give 
us pause, for the data suggest that there may exist a set o f  social dynamics strong 
enough to compromise, in less than a decade, a stream o f research that is 
apparently without immediate practical relevance.
Saffold (1988) has also critiqued notions o f corporate culture with its emphasis on 
‘strong’ culture. According to Saffold, culture is not unitary, but has many subcultures. 
Strength as a determinant o f culture is problematic for several reasons; 1) strong 
cultures often hindered the development o f  organizations because management and labor 
represented dominant subcultures that often had competing goals; 2) strong cultures 
imply that management’s goals are accepted, wherein in weak cultures they are not, 
which is a fallacy to assume that one set o f social values is superior to another; and 3) the 
notion o f strength is imprecise and carries with it quantitative methodologies that are 
foreign to the study o f  organizational culture. Kreiner (1989:65) had this to say about 
corporate culture:
While perhaps philosophically discomforting, the corporate culture literature turns 
“reality reduction” into a virtue. Strong cultures are “clear” cultures, often 
implying grossly reduced “realities.” Typically success is ascribed to a 
“seemingly unjustifiable overcommitment to some form o f quality, reliability, or 
service” . The successful employees o f  these successful companies develop an 
“obsession” with one or a few aspects o f their task.
Whereas the interpretive and functionalist paradigms have dominated the 
organizational culture literature, a third perspective has emerged that challenges the 
assumptions o f  the other two. Schultz (1992) suggested that a postmodern perspective on
13
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organizational culture is warranted. Postmodernism is often viewed as ‘anything goes’ 
because it is opposed to fixed categories and absolute meanings. Defining 
postmodernism is like trying to define Buddhism; however, postmodernism does share 
similar ontological leanings with the interpretive paradigm. From an epistemological 
position, truth is viewed as objective knowledge, wherein rigorous and critical standards 
o f  review may be used to judge that knowledge (Hatch 1997; Patterson and Williams 
1998; Cheney 2000). Postmodernism tends to align itself with critical theory and 
axiological goals o f uncovering power relationships and political influences in dictating 
behavior and decision-making processes (Pettigrew 1973; Hardy 1987; Stone 1997; 
Hatch 1997; Mumby 2001). Critical theory’s a priori hypothesis o f always looking to 
uncover power relationships has caused some to call it paradigmatic ‘arrogance’ (Cheney 
2000).
In a similar vein to the interpretivists, Schultz (1992) proposed postmodernism as 
a critique o f corporate culture’s modernist emphasis on controlling and manipulating 
culture for profit. Schultz (1992) posited that culture is a hollow rhetorical term used to 
seduce workers:
W ithin the postmodern kaleidoscope, corporate culture is not a meaningful 
guideline for organizational members on how to act. Corporate culture is 
seduction to act. Corporate culture is not a system of meaning that enforces 
repetition and uniform actions, but an alluring possibility for mutual reiteration. 
Just like Don Juan, culture flatters and allures the individual member o f the 
organization, promising identity, influence, and the great orgiastic amalgamation 
with the collective, whose members play their part in the rituals o f culture.
For Schultz (1992), corporate culture’s end game is not about satisficing through
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1997), but instead is a power game to create the worldview
o f  the organization. As such, Schultz (1992) concluded, “The modem notions o f
14
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corporate culture have come close to annihilating the concept o f culture through endlessly 
revealing the rules that regulate the organizational members’ interpretations o f  cultural 
expressions and the hidden patterns o f meaning turning organizational everyday life into 
meaningful behavior.”
Over time, these competing incommensurable views have become blurred by a 
fourth perspective -  those advocating an end to the ‘paradigm w ars.’ It is currently in 
vogue to dismiss notions o f incommensurability (lack o f a common language or meaning 
between a pair o f  theories) described by Kuhn (1970) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
Researchers instead have been encouraged to put aside their epistemological and 
ontological differences, and embrace mixed or triangulated methodologies, characterized 
by use o f  both qualitative and quantitative methods (Corman and Poole 2000; Tashakkori 
and Teddlie 1998; Denison 1996; Schultz and Hatch 1996; Sankey 1994; Martin 1992; 
and Ott 1989). The previous discussion on paradigms should provide the reader a useful 
frame o f reference for understanding how different organizational culture studies have 
been shown to influence organizational behavior.
How Does Organizational Culture Influence Behavior?
According to Harmon (1989), much o f the literature (March and Simon 1958; 
Cyert and M arch 1963; Simon 1997) has focused on decision making as the locus of 
study in organizational theory. As such, logical positivism has dominated the discourse. 
Harmon (1989) instead advocates shifting the emphasis o f  organizational theory to 
studying social ‘action’ or behavior, which can venture into the interpretive World.
Golden (1991:5) has elaborated on the definition o f action:
15
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Action is concrete behaviour that is based on either individual motivational 
patterns (e.g., personality) or on principles that the group or institution places on 
its members (e.g., social structure). In contrast, culture is the meaning o f action; 
that is, the historically-developed and socially-maintained (although not 
necessarily shared) system o f  symbols which individuals use to structure and to 
make sense o f  actions. .. .culture is not the cause o f action, but rather is the 
context which predisposes humans to take or not to take certain action.
Weick (1987), identified four outcomes o f action: 1) actions evoke justification —
reasons for actions are more important after decisions have been made; 2) actions
displace thinking — action as a substitute for cognition; 3) actions create environments —
culture; and 4) actions require interaction -  action is a social process. Others have raised
the issue o f the importance o f studying behavior and action as opposed to cognitions
(Geertz 1973). According to Eisenberg and Riley (2001:307):
It is clear to us that organizations are first and foremost action systems and that 
little is gained in trying to separate enactment from interpretation. For this 
reason, the organizational cognition approach, to the extent that it is characterized 
by a mostly private view o f language and an individualistic bias, will fall short. 
This is not to say that cognitions are unimportant, only that their importance 
depends entirely on their relationship to action and behavior and to ongoing 
conduct with a  public conversation.
Whereas the importance o f studying organizational behavior or action as a 
component o f organizational theory has been emphasized, others (Sackmann 1991;
Schein 1992) have shown that artifacts, o f  which behavior is a component, are only one 
level o f cultural analysis. Assumptions and basic beliefs fall within the cognitive realm o f 
inquiry and organizational culture researchers have tended to neglect this level of 
analysis. According to Hatch (1997:216), behavioral expressions o f artifacts include, but 
are not limited to: ceremonies/rituals, communication patterns, traditions/customs, and 
rewards/punishments. She includes dress/appearance as a physical manifestation o f 
artifacts and distinguishes verbal cues (stories, jokes, metaphors) from behavior;
16
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however, both could easily be included as behavioral expressions o f culture (Sackmann 
1991).
Numerous studies exist that attempt to document the influence that culture has 
had on organizational behavior. As has been discussed earlier, however, most o f those 
studies fall within either the corporate culture field (functionalist paradigm) or within the 
organizational culture realm (interpretive paradigm). Given this distinction in the 
literature, both types o f studies will be presented to afford the reader the full breadth o f  
understanding.
Corporate Culture Studies
Studies o f corporate culture can be summed up in the view portrayed by Lahiry 
(1994:50-51):
Culture represents the values, beliefs, and expectations shared by its members. 
Culture exerts pressure on its members to conform to shared codes. Culture 
shapes people’s behaviors. From an organization development standpoint, the 
concept o f organizational culture suggests an avenue for fostering changes in 
behavior and attitudes to bring about desired results.
In one o f the classic studies on corporate culture, Hofstede (1980) studied the 
influence o f  national cultures on IBM in over forty countries. Hofstede (1980) postulated 
that national cultural differences accounted for differences in promotions, retention o f 
employees, interaction with customers (facing toward vs. facing away), job satisfaction, 
motivation, union membership, and attitudes/perceptions toward management and the 
parent company. In analyzing data, he found that behavior, reflected by attitudes 
expressed by managers could be explained by four dimensions: power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Power distance referred to how
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different countries dealt with issues o f human inequality, such as prestige, wealth, and
power. Denmark is a country that is characterized by low power distance. Danish law
proclaims that no one individual should have more than or stand out from others. The
United States was identified as having a mid-level power distance. Uncertainty
avoidance describes the ways in which countries have learned to cope with uncertainty.
Countries with low uncertainty avoidance tend to develop technology and/or regulatory
environments to anticipate uncertainty and plan for it. Singapore, Hong Kong, Sweden,
and Denmark had the weakest levels o f uncertainty avoidance with the United States not
far behind. Individualism describes the degree to which individuals in a society act
independently o f each other. Whereas individualism tended to be high in the United
States where it is viewed as a sign o f  well-being, it tended to be lower in South American
countries where it can be seen as alienating. Finally, masculinity refers to the roles that
different genders play in society. Japan and many o f  the South American countries
tended to have high levels o f masculinity where women are expected to be less assertive,
while Denmark, Sweden, and Norway had low levels o f masculinity.
Another classic study on corporate culture was conducted by Deal and Kennedy
(1982). According to Deal and Kennedy (1982:4-5):
Whether weak or strong, culture has a powerful influence throughout the 
organization; it affects practically everything — from who gets promoted and what 
decisions are made, to how employees dress and what sports they play.
...In  fact, a strong culture has almost always been the driving force behind 
continuing success in American business.
In their survey, they developed profiles o f nearly eighty companies. In general, they
found that cultures were unique, unitary, and that strong cultures had a widely-shared
philosophy and valued the importance o f  people. They also identified five common
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elements o f culture: 1) business environment -  determines what is necessary for success;
2) values — basic concepts and beliefs; 3) heroes — charismatic or visionary leaders; 4)
rites and rituals -  day-to-day routines that show employees what behavior is expected o f
them; and 5) the cultural network — the framework by which the corporate message is
carried. Strong cultures embody these five elements and can be used as a guiding tool for
shaping behavior. Specifically, a strong culture spells out how people are to behave most
o f  the time, which has been shown to increase productivity in the workplace by as much
as one to two hours per day per employee. Secondly, a strong culture enables people to
identify with the organization, and ultimately work harder. Culture has the ability to
make workers more or less productive, cultivate team players or individuals, or
encourage tough or easy-going managers.
Deal and Kennedy (1982:60) defined rites and rituals as the guiding force behind
organizational behavior:
In short, strong culture companies create the rites and rituals o f behavior in their 
corporate life — the rites and rituals that exercise the most visible and pervasive 
influence on, as Bower says it, “the way we do things around here."
Retirement ceremonies, promotions, presentation o f rewards, coordination activities (i.e.,
meetings, memos) are all examples o f  rituals to be orchestrated and managed to produce
desired behaviors. Deal and Kennedy (1982) even provided managers with five
standards for influencing employees actions or behavior: 1) language standards; 2)
public decorum; 3) interpersonal behavior (what is acceptable); 4) presentation and
format; and 5) explicit instructions. According to Deal and Kennedy (1982:82), “The
rituals people learn in one culture mark them — in effect, train them — in a specific mode
o f behavior.”
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In summary, Deal and Kennedy (1982) identified four common cultures that exist 
across the range o f organizations: 1) the tough guy, macho culture -  risk takers and 
quick feedback, role for superstition as a ritual; 2) the work hard/play hard culture — high 
energy level, with low tolerance for risk, importance o f  energetic games/parties for 
motivation; 3) the bet-your-company culture — a high risk, slow-feedback environment, 
business meeting as primary ritual; and 4) the process culture — hard to measure what is 
done, so focus is on process (i.e., beauracracy), reorganization and retirements are 
important rituals.
Baker (1980) provided suggestions for how to  shape culture. He identified eight
techniques for fostering a desired culture: 1) role modeling -  leader exhibits behavior
consistent with norms and values; 2) positive reinforcement — reinforce desired
behaviors; 3) communication — articulate desired norms; 4) recruitment o f employees; 5)
promotion and transfer decisions; 6) training; 7) organization design — formal structure,
performance appraisal; and 8) physical design o f the building. All o f  the techniques
discussed above could be used to engineer or create a culture and subsequently maintain
that culture by influencing behavior.
Weick (1985) articulated that corporate ‘strategy’ was a synonym for corporate
‘culture.’ As such, both can influence behavior because they guide expression and
interpretation; they provide continuity and identity; they are embodied in actions such as
judging, creating, justifying affirming, and sanctioning; and they are social and
summarize what is acceptable behavior. Weick (1985:385) concluded:
Strong cultures may be slower to respond to external change, but because o f their 
coherence, they may also be foreceful actors and better able to create the 
environments they want. Strong cultures may exhibit action rationality and be 
able to bypass the laborious deliberations that are necessary to achieve decision
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rationality. Strong cultures may be slow, but they may also be powerful. Because 
they are successful at proaction, they could suffer less from their inherent 
tendency to be slow to react.
Hofstede et al. (1990) used qualitative and quantitative methods to measure 
organizational culture. They used a combination o f interviews and questionnaires to 
assess culture. The qualitative data from the interviews was used to develop the 
questionnaires. Using a multivariate analysis technique, they found that shared 
perceptions o f daily practices or behaviors are the core o f  an organization’s culture. 
Practices can also be labeled conventions, customs, habits, mores, traditions, and usages. 
Hofstede et al. (1990:311) concluded that, “the values o f founders and key leaders 
undoubtedly shape the organizational cultures but that the way these cultures affect 
ordinary members is through members’ practices.”
In an effort to test Downs’ (1967) “life cycle” theory, McCurdy (1991) conducted 
a case study on the decline o f  NASA through the use o f  a cultural questionnaire. 
According to Downs (1967:20), “all organizations tend to become more conservative as 
they grow older, unless they experience periods o f  very rapid growth or internal 
turnover.” Conservatism is a synonym for low risk tolerance, which has been a 
behavioral feature o f cultural studies. Following its creation in 1958 until 1966, NA SA ’s 
budget expanded eight-fold. However, budget cutbacks and a lack o f public support 
contributed to a rapid reduction in the country’s space program through the 1970s.
During this time, the work force aged (young scientists decreased from 37 percent in 
1966 to 12 percent in 1978), promotion rates declined, and turnover rates declined to just 
5 percent. In support o f  Downs’ (1967) aging theory, NASA agency officials have 
become more conservative. McCurdy (1991:313) stated:
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This part o f the aging theory [ascension o f  conservers] appears to be half true for 
NASA. Agency management may have become more conservative, but the 
underlying culture remained one in which NASA professionals prized change. A 
conservative organization is a matter o f  values, a question o f  what type of 
behavior the members hold dear. These values are reflected in the type o f people 
elevated form middle-management ranks to lead the organization and the beliefs 
that make up the agency.
In summary. Downs’ theory cannot be proven; however, the NASA experience provides
for some refinements. It is not possible to isolate the influences o f
bureaucratization/conservatism on NASA due to age versus changes in the federal
government prescribed by Congress. The NASA officials ultimately retained a culture
devoted to change, yet the increase in conservative behavior may be more o f a reflection
of organizational decline than from the promotion o f  conservative employees.
According to Lawson and Ventriss (1992:205), “organizational learning, goal
setting, and self- and collective efficacies are central to the influence o f  organizational
upon specific organizational performances.” Organizational learning aims to adjust
overall norms, while at the same time creating new skill development, new knowledge,
and new norms and insights. Goal setting is a key instrument in modifying behavior.
Specifically, setting goals can achieve the following: 1) serve as immediate regulators o f
human action; 2) challenge individuals and lead to greater effort and persistence; 3) yield
higher levels o f performance; and 4) encourage public commitment. Lawson and
Ventriss (1992:215-217) concluded:
The present descriptive findings o f organizational change suggest that setting and 
promoting public commitment to specific organizational goals can yield specific 
changes in shared behaviors as well as shard beliefs and values about the 
organization and how members view themselves.
In summary, it appears as if  an organizational culture that promotes high levels o f 
performance by specific and challenging goals, performance measures, incentives.
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and performance feedback mechanisms can lead to enhanced performances at the 
individual and organizational levels—
A t the request o f Senator John Glenn, the GAO (1992) conducted a study of 
organizational/corporate culture in an effort to provide the Department o f  Defense with 
ideas on managing and changing culture. Consistent with the corporate culture literature, 
the GAO developed a typology o f  techniques (Table 1) used to perpetuate or change 
culture based on surveys o f  nine corporations.
Table 1. Techniques Organizations Use to Perpetuate or Change Their Culture
(GAO 1992:3)
Degree of
Importance Technique
Verv Great Display top management commitment and support for values and
beliefs;
Train employees to convey and develop skills related to values and 
beliefs.
Great Develop a statement o f values and beliefs;
Communicate values and beliefs to employees;
Use a management style compatible with values and beliefs;
Offer rewards, incentives, and promotions to encourage behavior 
compatible with beliefs;
Convey and support values and beliefs at organizational 
gatherings;
Make the organization’s structure compatible with values and 
beliefs;
Set up systems, procedures, and processes compatible with values 
and beliefs.
Moderate Replace or change responsibilities o f employees who do not
support desired values and beliefs;
Use stories, legends, or myths to convey values and beliefs;
Make heroes or heroines o f exemplars o f  values and beliefs.
Some Recruit employees who possess or will readily accept values and
beliefs;
Use slogans to symbolize values and beliefs;
Assign a manager or group primary responsibility for efforts to 
change or perpetuate culture.
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Bourgault et al. (1993) studied organizations within the Canadian federal
government and identified the role o f performance appraisals in creating a corporate
culture and influencing behavior. Borrowing from Schein’s (1992) model, performance
appraisals would fall into the realm o f cultural artifacts. Bourgault et al. (1993)
conducted 17 interviews using a questionnaire with the goal o f determining whether or
not performance appraisals o f top bureaucrats influenced the values and culture o f  the
Canadian government. Their findings suggested that the performance appraisal does
indeed have a homogenizing effect on the values o f  the deputy ministers. According to
Bourgault et al. (1993:77):
The performance appraisal system was therefore, appreciated, for the most part, 
important, and had an integrating effect. It increased interdependence and group 
unity by making the judgment o f one’s peers a source o f professional satisfaction. 
A performance review implies evaluation criteria. These criteria are not neutral: 
they inevitably influence work behaviors and encourage the adoption o f  certain 
priorities and values over others.
In conclusion, the performance appraisal created a shared corporate culture among 
Canada’s deputy ministers. The fact that the evaluations were based on common criteria 
encouraged the sharing o f  those associated values.
Near et al. (1993) studied organizational climate (culture) in reference to whistle­
blowing. The purpose o f their study was to identify measures o f organizational values 
that are related to whisde-blowing and to determine if  the values were related to actual 
practices. Whistle-blowers have been viewed as dissidents and reformers in the 
literature. Accordingly, using Downs’ (1967) theory they could be viewed as zealots or 
advocates, or using M artin’s (1992) typology o f subcultures, they could be identified as a 
fragmented subgroup. The positive view o f whistle-blowing as a behavior believes that 
the practice can help to promote efficiency, productivity, and quality of the organizational
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performance. The authors developed a questionnaire, wherein they assessed values and
identified measures o f practices or behaviors associated with wrongdoing: stealing funds,
stealing property, accepting bribes, waste, abuse o f  position, or violation o f laws or
regulations. Their results showed that a subgroups’ values were not necessarily related to
their practices or behavior. According to Near et al. (1993):
Our results are important because they call into question some o f the current 
advice given to managers in organizations. For instance, managing corporate 
culture has gained much attention since popular writers maintained that 
organization culture is an important predictor o f organization actions; however, 
our results do not support this widely held assumption. Instead, organizational 
values are not always related to the actual practice or events taking place currently 
with the organization.
The authors offer three possible reasons for their findings: 1) given that an organizations’ 
values are based on history, there may likely be a time lag between when the values 
might be revised and when they would be reflected in actions; 2) the lag in revision to 
values may not solely be related to time, but instead due to different knowledge among 
the organizations’ members; and 3) the study did not evaluate the effects o f how 
precursors of the organization’s values might have acted as a moderating force on the 
effects o f  values on whistle-blowing.
In contrast to Near et al., Klein et al. (1995) worked from the assumption that as 
components o f  organizational culture, “behavioral expectations can be viewed as shared 
phenomena that influence the thinking and behavior o f  organizational members.” The 
authors surveyed 823 members from 159 different organizations to assess organization 
culture, service quality, and control structure. Their findings suggested that there is in 
fact a strong correlation between service quality and organization culture. Additionally,
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their findings suggested that constructive styles o f management, greater amounts of 
control, and control distribution all led to higher perceptions o f quality.
Following on Hofstede’s (1980) work on international cultures, Lee and Barnett 
(1997) set out to determine whether or not national cultures associated with similar banks 
in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan affects their organizational cultures. Taiwanese 
and Citibank employees felt that socializing with coworkers was related to success, more 
so than did American and Japanese employees. These findings are a testament to the 
view that Taiwanese people typically ascribe success to harmonious relationships with 
coworkers. Additionally, it was found that Americans do not socialize with their 
supervisors as much as do the Taiwanese and the Japanese. This was attributed to 
participatory decision-making models typically adopted by Japanese supervisors that 
necessitated involvement and communication with subordinates. In summary, they found 
that there are significant differences in the organizational cultures o f the banks studied, 
and their organizational cultures were directly influenced by the culture o f the country 
that they were located in.
Daley and Vasu (1998) employed a regression analysis to assess the influence o f 
corporate culture on work behaviors in North Carolina state government. In their study, 
they looked specifically at the role that trust and commitment plays in increasing 
productivity. Hypotheses that were supported through their study included the following: 
1) higher perceptions that benefits are adequate will lead to higher trust; 2) higher 
perceptions o f  extrinsic reward opportunities will lead to higher trust; 3) perceptions that 
available resources are adequate will lead to higher trust; 4) perceptions that the work 
environment is clean and safe will lead to higher trust; 5) higher job  satisfaction will lead
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to higher trust; 6) perceptions o f  political interference will lead to lower trust; and 7) 
higher assessments o f  supervisory performance will lead to higher levels o f trust. These 
results emphasize the role that a supervisor has in cultivating a trusting environment by 
providing employees with necessary tools to complete their jobs, rewarding them 
sufficiently, and providing a  safe working environment. Daley and Vasu (1998) 
concluded that trust is a catalyst in creating a framework in which productivity can be 
enhanced. A corporate culture that values trust encourages cooperation and enables 
employees to focus on the task at hand.
Another characteristic o f  corporate culture is an organization’s tolerance for risk. 
Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) found that trust also played a factor in determining an 
organization’s ‘risk culture.’ Risk culture is defined in terms o f employees perceptions 
o f their co-workers and supervisors’ willingness to promote and take risks. The authors 
borrow the concept o f  risk-taking from Deal and Kennedy’s (1982) typology o f cultures. 
A questioimaire was mailed to private and public organizations in Syracuse and Albany, 
New York. Mid-level and top-level managers were surveyed, with the chief dependent 
variable being TOTAL RISK. TOTAL RISK was assessed used a 10 point scale (10 — 
strong agreement; 1 — strong disagreement) in response to the following statements: 1) 
most employees in this organization are not afraid to take risks; and 2) top management 
in this organization is not afraid to take risks. The authors found that managers who trust 
their employees promoted increased risk taking, as did clear and well-defined goals and 
missions. The authors also showed that increased levels o f  ‘red tape’ and formalism 
(rules and procedures), decreased an organization’s tolerance for risk taking. Consistent 
with findings from Daley and Vasu (1998), the authors also found that external political
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interference or control is also likely to dampen an organization’s risk tolerance. The 
authors also noted that risk culture did not vary much between public and private 
organizations, but was more influenced by the factors described above.
Organizational Culture Studies
Whereas the previous set o f studies tended to adopt quantitative methodologies in
the study o f corporate culture, organizational culture studies have tended to emphasize
qualitative methods (ethnography, in-depth interviews, participant observation) within an
interpretive paradigm. Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo (1983) offered a conceptual
critique o f systems theory and how it has influenced communication studies. For too
long, communication has been viewed as a system o f inputs, outputs, transfers, storage,
and processes. They argued that systems theory fostered a view o f  organizations as
highly complex and tightly coupled, when in fact they are loosely bound social
conventions. They expressed concern that many studying organizational culture tended
to apply a ‘systems’ view, without sufficiently exploring how culture is manifested in
behaviors within unique cultures. Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo (1983:130) used
the metaphor o f  a theater to describe how organizational culture influences behavior:
The theatricality o f  performances suggests that organizational members are 
choice-making individuals. Organizational members do not “conform” to 
behavioral laws, but rather act (or more precisely, choose to act) in ways which 
reflect (or flout) the social conventions o f  other organizational members.
The authors identified four categories o f ritual that serve as expressions o f culture.
Personal rituals (i.e., motivational locker room antics) are individual performances that
tend to mold the actor’s organizational identity. Task rituals are day-to-day routines that
permit the job  to be completed. The organizational culture permits these tasks to be
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completed with little cognitive energy expended. Social rituals or performances (i.e., 
Friday afternoon beer gatherings) can serve as a force to strengthen identification within 
a subculture or the larger organization. Finally, organizational rituals like company 
picnics or award ceremonies are viewed as events that reveal larger features o f an 
organization’s culture.
Following Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo’s work. Trice and Beyer (1984) 
conceptually studied organizational cultures through rites and ceremonials. They 
identified a typology o f  six rites and rituals that are expressions o f  organizational culture:
1) rites o f passage — i.e., basic training in the Army; 2) rites o f  degradation — i.e., public 
disciplinary actions; 3) rites o f enhancement — i.e., rewards, award ceremonies; 4) rites o f 
renewal — i.e., organizational development activities like team building; 5) rites o f 
conflict reduction -  i.e., collective bargaining and arbitration; and 6) rites o f  integration — 
socialization events like Christmas parties. According to the authors, this typology is 
useful for identifying and understanding organizational behaviors and occurrences that 
might otherwise be overlooked.
Martin and Siehl (1983) surveyed published literature and conducted a content 
analysis to uncover core values and a counterculture that existed at General Motors (GM) 
in the early 1980s. GM was characterized as a company that had a fairly strong 
centralized authority structure with a degree o f  autonomy afforded to different divisions 
(Pontiac and Chevrolet) on operating issues. The dominant culture at GM was 
characterized by three values: 1) respecting authority; 2) fitting in; and 3) being loyal. 
These values were manifested in various behaviors. For instance, to show respect for 
authority, an airport ritual was developed in which subordinates would meet their
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superiors at the airport, carry their luggage, pay for their meals, and accompany them to
their hotel. In an effort to fit in, all employees wore a dark suit, a light shirt, and a muted
tie. This ensured that no single employee stood out. Finally, loyalty to one’s boss was
manifested in stories and the company rite o f  the retirement dinner. It was stated that one
GM employee testified before Congress in the 1950s that what was good for GM was
good for the country. Expressions o f loyalty were exemplified at the retirement dinner,
which was the focal point for recounting the storied past o f  the senior executives.
Through their analysis, the authors uncovered a counterculture wherein Mr.
DeLorean, a division manager, bucked the dominant culture o f  respecting authority,
fitting in, and loyalty at all costs. DeLorean valued dissent and worked to change the
performance appraisals in his division. He refused to be escorted by subordinates when
traveling from airports; he wore suits with a continental cut and shirts that were off-
white; and he raised concerns about groupthink with the example o f the appalling safety
record o f  the Corvair. Martin and Siehl (1983:63) concluded with their thoughts on the
role of countercultures:
A counterculture can serve some useful functions for a dominant culture, 
articulating the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate behavior and 
providing a safe haven for the development o f  innovative ideas.
Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) utilized ethnographic methods (conducted in-depth
open-ended interviews, and reviewed pertinent agency records, memos and reports) to
explore the role that the reorganization process had on impacting the dominant subculture
o f the Kansas Department o f Health and Environment (KDHE). Using Schein’s (1992)
model o f  cultural analysis, reorganizations can be viewed as artifacts or symbols. The <
authors began their study with three common assumptions: 1) reorganizations are
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common; 2) reorganizations are characterized by the rhetoric o f efficiency or the
“managerial metamyth” (Adams and Ingersoll 1985, 1990); and 3) reorganizations rarely
produce improvements in efficiency or productivity. However, the authors do view
reorganizations highly symbolic that serve to alter the power structure in organizations.
According to Maynard-Moody et al. (1986:302), the dominant subculture legitimates and
perpetuates power structures in an organization:
The dominant subculture is, we hypothesize, the primary agent o f  the 
institutionalization o f organizational power. The dominant subculture exercises 
power more by determining the agenda and legitimate actors and less by winning 
any specific policy battles. The dominant subculture controls the “decision 
structure” o f  who gets to participate in policy deliberations and the “access 
structure” which legitimates certain problems, solutions, and criteria as worth o f 
consideration.
In their study, they identified five time periods that characterized the rise and fall 
o f the dominant subculture within the KDHE: 1) 1885-1904: Organizational beginnings 
-  Board o f Health founded with minimal authority, budget, or staff; 2) 1904-1923: 
Founding o f the Crumbine Subculture — Dr. Crumbine was appointed as the Secretary o f 
Health, wherein budget and staff grew exponentially. (Crumbine established a culture 
premised on the supreme role o f science, pride in one’s work, and a disregard for politics 
and the influences o f  politics on the agency. As such, Crumbine hired employees that 
tended to have high levels o f technical expertise); 3) 1924-1974: Business as usual — 
Crumbine departed in 1923; however, the dominant subculture remained intact 
dominated by physicians and engineers, which valued expertise over politics; 4) 1974- 
1983: Holding on — in 1974, a major reorganization took place in which the old Board o f 
Health was abolished and the KDHE was established in its place and elevated to a cabinet 
position to be headed by a political appointee. (This profound structural change had a
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minimal impact on the agency due to the fact that an internal candidate was appointed as
the Secretary; however, it was now more difficult to ignore politics and its influences);
and 5) 1983 — present: Coup d ’etat — in 1983, for the first time, an outsider was
appointed as the Secretary o f KDHE. Secretary Sabol had little regard for the Crumbine
subculture and embarked upon an effort to purge the old culture by instituting a new set
o f values and power structure. All managerial positions were reclassified and
readvertised to de-emphasize technical skills, instead emphasizing managerial skills. The
new Sabol culture, emphasized a responsiveness to political concerns consistent with
legislative intent and financial accountability.
Through their study, the authors came to view reorganizations as social dramas.
Organizational charts are symbols or artifacts, and the inauguration o f a new leader is a
behavioral rite. Maynard-Moody et al. (1986:308-309) concluded:
Our research indicates that reorganizations have profound symbolic and 
communicative impacts. Reorganizations are organizational status dramas that 
are best understood by what they tell the members about their social system.
.. .Reorganizations are not merely technical acts o f  designing the most efficient 
organizational chart and filling positions with the best qualified. They are social 
interventions that may challenge deeply held assumptions.
Wilkins and Dyer (1988) provided a conceptual critique o f corporate culture
based on cultural “fi-ames.” Specifically, the authors argued that culture is something that
‘is,’ not what an organization ‘has.’ They also questioned the adequacy o f  questionnaires
in the study or understanding o f  culture, but instead advocated the use o f  ethnographic
methods within a symbolic interactionist paradigm.
Wilkins and Dyer (1988:523) defined organizational culture as, “socially acquired
and shared knowledge that is embodied in specific and general organizational frames o f
reference.” Frames o f reference are ‘cultural maps’ that enable members to develop an
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appropriate response action to a specific situation or stimuli. Frames are related to the
lack o f organizational decision making associated with routine actions. Examples o f
reference frames are ideologies, strategies for completing work assignments, contingency
strategies, working relationships, operational tempo, and respect for authority.
Organizational frames can be used to interpret events and affect what is learned. Wilkins
and Dyer (1988:531) concluded:
Researchers must take culture into account in order to understand, describe, or 
influence culture change. We question the conventional wisdom found in the 
literature suggesting that all organizational cultures change or can be changed 
using the same methods or processes. Such views ignore cultural differences 
among organizations in their orientation and their ability to change, in their 
experience with alternative cultural frames, and in their interpreation o f events, 
past or present.
Mahler (1988) utilized qualitative methods to uncover meaning in organizational
stories by interviewing 19 officials at the Agency for International Development (AID).
Stories are symbolic artifacts that signify or typify values or ideas associated with the
organization. Whereas some have questioned the validity o f “stories” as good science,
Hummel (1991:37-39 argued;
Contrary to the analytic scientist, who takes for granted the existence o f a shared 
world that has relevance to all who use his approach, the manager listening to a 
story is concerned with the prior problem o f establishing the relevance o f the 
world told about to his own world and his interests in it. ... In sum, managers first 
and foremost communicate through stories that constitute or construct their world. 
How could it be otherwise?
Mahler (1988) asked officials eight questions: 1) Why did you join AID? 2) 
What are your reasons for remaining with the agency? 3) How would you characterize 
the mission o f AID? 4) How committed are you to the mission and AID? 5) How would 
you characterize the motivation at AID? 6) How did you learn about AID’s mission? 7) 
What events illustrate what working for AID is all about? and 8) Have you been abroad
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for AID? The most prominent theme that emerged from the data, was that “only through 
experiencing firsthand the rigors and setbacks o f  life in the field could one really 
understand the development mission [of AID] and be committed to it.” The high 
importance attached to field experience requires staff to rotate between the field offices 
and Washington, D.C. Promotions were predicated on field experience, typically 
requiring two tours abroad before returning to D.C. Shared field experiences and 
hardships also enabled officials to understand why policies did not always work in host 
countries, and also served to build a camaraderie among employees.
Adams and Ingersoll (1990) jumped on the bandwagon o f  those (Barley 1988 and 
others) who decried the negative impact that functionalism or technical rationality has 
had on stunting the advancement o f the interpretive paradigm in the study of 
organizational culture. The authors likened the centrality o f water for fish to the role that 
culture plays in human social life. As such it is not very malleable or subject to being 
managed. In their critique o f technical rationality as a set o f beliefs, Adams and Ingersoll 
(1985, 1990) described it as the “managerial metamyth” or a metapattem (Adams 1993). 
M etapattems may be constructive, benign, or dysfunctional and are developed by leaders 
in concert with members o f  the organization to “organize” members’ behavior (Adams 
1993). The managerial metamyth includes the following beliefs: 1) eventually all work 
processes can and should be rationalized — that is broken into their constituent parts and 
so thoroughly understood that they can be completely controlled; 2) the means for 
attaining organizational objectives or ends deserve maximum attention with the result 
that the ends quickly become subordinated to those means, even to the extent that the 
ends become lost or forgotten; and 3) efficiency and predictability are more important
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than any other considerations in managing an organization. According to the authors, the 
managerial metamyth permeates all segments o f society (academic and applied) and is 
transmitted through symbolic messages in organizations, the media, and the literature.
Adams and Ingersoll (1990) conducted an ethnographic study to assess how the 
managerial metamyth influenced the organizational culture and behavior o f  members 
employed by the Washington State Ferry System. This ferry system is the largest in the 
United States, operating more than 22 vessels, carrying more than 17 million people, and 
employing 1,200 people. Until 1951, the ferry system was owned and operated by a 
private company called the Black Ball Line, which was renowned for its reliability and 
‘family style’ culture. The authors labeled this culture as the family metamyth, which is 
characterized by close relationships, and statements such as: “one big happy family and 
“a family-owned business.” The employees exhibited behaviors such as taking interest in 
one another’s personal lives, playing sports together, participating in Friday afternoon 
social events, and regularly telling jokes.
Black Ball Line sold the company in 1951 due to increased costs and the state 
bought the ferry system. Until the early 1970s, the ferry system operated much as it had 
under Black Ball Line. However, in 1972, rising operating costs and budget 
accountability forced the state to make changes. Whereas the ferry system had 
previously had a large degree o f autonomy, it was reorganized and moved within the 
Department o f Transportation (DOT) in 1977. Unlike the ferry system, DOT had a 
professional military subculture with distinct lines o f  authority. This subculture would 
work to gain control o f  the ferry system and change the its core identity. A new 
Secretary o f  Transportation, Dan Parte, took office in 1981 and he immediately began to
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implement the managerial metamyth. He emphasized the need for strategic planning and
called for increases in efficiency and automation. During this transition. Parte replaced
77 percent o f  the top managers in the system, including Dick Foster, the captain o f the
fleet. With Foster’s departure, the family atmosphere (parties, sports, and joking) ended.
Other changes were instituted, such as installing bell loggers, which could determine
whether or not a captain was liable for accidents or using too much fuel. The bell loggers
and the “Flying T ” logo o f DOT were resented by the employees o f  the old family
culture, and symbolically viewed as D O T’s ascendancy over the ferry system. Adams
and Ingersoll (1990:299) concluded:
Some might say that such language — replete with words such as accountability, 
planning, evaluation, performance review, and efficiency -  is what management 
is all about and that the words represent an essential approach to the successful 
operation o f large, complex organizations. The very acceptance o f the necessity 
o f an approach that embodies this language is evidence that it is indeed part o f  a 
culture that transcends particular organizations. And the fact that it becomes 
resisted without great cost indicates that the managerial metamyth can become 
embedded in an organization’s cultural ethos even though it includes values alien 
to the organization’s initial tradition.
Sackmann (1991) employed a phenomenological methodology to understand the 
nature o f  culture from a cognitive or ideational perspective. In doing so, she conducted 
30 in-depth interviews in an unnamed firm in Los Angeles. She asked the following 
question: “Name three iimovations at the company in the past 5 years that they 
considered the most important.” During the course o f  the interview, they were asked to 
explain their answers with follow up questions focusing on why was it important, what 
caused the innovation, and who was involved in its development. Themes were 
identified in the data using content analyses. Four cultural themes emerged from the data 
regarding dictionary knowledge (commonly held descriptions): 1) the company’s major
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goal and accomplishments; 2) the company’s strategy; 3) its structure; and 4) its 
orientation toward people. Additionally, four cultural themes emerged from the data 
regarding directory knowledge (commonly held explanations o f  operations): 1) the 
specific ways in which tasks are accomplished; 2) the relationships among people on the 
inside as well as the outside; 3) the way adaptation and change are accomplished; and 4) 
the way new knowledge is acquired.
These different cultural themes impacted employee behavior in various ways.
The company’s major goal was to build a stable and successful company. Behaviors that 
contributed to this were an increase in employees, perceived job security, more work, 
expansion o f the department, and the opening o f a subsidiary. The structure o f  the 
company was fairly decentralized, therefore promoting behaviors exemplified by large 
amounts o f  autonomy. The theme o f  orientation toward people supported behaviors such 
as people-oriented management, being fair, having a chance, listening, encouragement, 
instilling confidence, helping people progress, and hiring from within. Tasks were 
completed using autonomous and team efforts. Taking initiative was emphasized. 
Relationships among people were described as informal, direct, open, and respectful. 
Adaptation and change were facilitated through conservative and innovative behavior. 
When large sums o f money were involved, conservative behavior was predominant; 
however, day-to-day activities were characterized by innovative behavior when money 
was not an issue. Knowledge was acquired through attendance at trade shows, reading 
trade journals, and recruitment o f  new employees. In summary, the author identified 
seven subcultures under dictionary knowledge and a monolithic culture under directory 
knowledge. As such Sackmann (1991:313) stated, “This [identification o f subcultures]
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implies that the proposed methodology is not only sufficiently sensitive to discover 
existing subcultures but also capable o f  differentiating between kinds o f  subgroupings at 
different levels o f  cultural knowledge.”
Golden (1992) conducted a qualitative study o f  a Fortune 500 Company with the 
pseudonym HAPCO. Golden spent one full year studying HAPCO and utilized 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and archival data collection to 
generate data. The author acknowledged general themes in the literature that suggest that 
the latitude for individual action increases as the orderliness o f the organization 
decreases; however, pointed out that individuals do not only conform to the dominant 
culture, but deviate from it when they comment critically on their situation. According to 
Golden (1992:6)
This company [HAPCO] consists o f a socio-cultural system based on tradition 
which authoritatively regulates individual action. ...th is system restricts the 
latitude for individual action in HAPCO and employees find it difficult to depart 
from legitimate patterns o f practice and belief. In particular, this system acts to 
reduce conflict, including the overt discussion o f alternative ideas and differences 
o f opinion in organizational decision-making activities.
Golden (1992) found a general theme or culture o f  cooperation permeated the
organization. Cooperation was emphasized because it had helped the company survive
hard times following World War II. As such, executives place a premium on
cooperation, including being a team player and limiting sources o f  conflict. Cooperation
is regarded as a superior way o f interacting with coworkers. The culture o f cooperation
has elicited three responses from management to differences o f  opinion: 1) note the
differences and discuss later, which is the most common method o f dealing with conflict;
2) recommend that the subordinate look into his concerns with no real intention of
addressing the conflict; or 3) exert some forceful action or outburst to express displeasure
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and move on. In her observations. Golden (1992) noted times when the dominant norms
and culture o f cooperation were eluded. She documented a particular instance wherein a
subordinate disagreed publicly with the President o f  the company and he pushed the
President for a decision even when he disagreed with the recommendation.
Golden (1992) identified four types o f  action that individuals exhibited toward the
dominant culture of the organization: 1) unequivocal adherence — reflects agreement; 2)
strained adherence -  individuals feel they must adhere to culture, but experience tension
in doing so; 3) non-adherence — covert or secretive departure from the culture, involving
deceptive practices; and 4) overt non-adherence -  open or public defiance o f  guidelines.
In summary. Golden (1992:19) stated:
Clearly, no organization can continue to survive over time without some order 
and uniformity in action. However, to assume that action is a derivative o f  culture 
neglects the fact that humans are individuals who, even in highly-ordered 
organizations, can create latitude and freedom in action by challenging cultural 
guidelines.
Kunda (1992) was given access to SysCom, a company o f about 600 employees 
where she employed ethnographic ‘realism’ methods while acting as a passive observer 
in the organization. She was given office space as well as access to three projects. There 
she gained access to training sessions and was given a first hand account o f the entire 
organization, including senior management.
Working within the interpretive paradigm, she set out in her study to explore, 
describe, and evaluate the reality and rhetoric o f  corporate culture. In her findings, she 
noted three main themes in the management o f culture. First, management at SysCom 
paid a lot o f attention to developing and disseminating the organizational ideology or 
culture within the company. The ideology portrayed the company as morally sound.
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organic, undifferentiated, and defined members’ roles as the socialization o f the
company’s values. Secondly, the ideological principles or assumptions upon which the
company was foimded are embodied in specific policies aimed to elicit behaviors
consistent with the dominant culture. Thirdly, certain rites and rituals (i.e., company
gatherings, etc.) are utilized to encourage and enforce conformance to the dominant
culture. Through the increased use o f control mechanisms, Kunda (1992) saw the rise of
corporate culture as a manifestation o f  power disguised through rhetoric. Kunda
(1992:223-226) concluded:
On the face o f it, the argument for tyranny would seem to have some merit. In its 
attention to the formulation and dissemination o f ideology. Tech management 
[SysCom] indeed resembles Big Brother (as some members point out). Similarly, 
the widespread use o f  rituals, the importance attached to group testimonials, and 
the face-to-face control they allow are reminiscent o f brainwashing techniques. 
Moreover, members report feeling intense pressure, an invasion o f their private 
life by corporate requirements, and, in many cases, considerable personal 
suffering, manifested in burnout and associated forms o f despair. Together, these 
facts seem to support the critics’ claims that the modem corporation is fast 
becoming -  if it has not already become — a monstrosity that “bosses not only our 
working hours but invades our homes and dictates our thought and dreams.”
...A t Tech, indeed, analysis o f the role, use and social consequences o f the 
company’s technology was conspicuous by its absence; rather, such issues are 
glossed over by words like “innovation,” “productivity,” “profit,” with their 
connotations o f  inevitability and rightness.
In  order to counter what she sees as corporate culture and the managerial metamyth gone
awry, Kunda (1992) calls on priests, teachers, government leaders, media operators and
the like to articulate an alternate view o f  reality.
Casey (1999) followed in Kunda’s footsteps, employing interpretive analysis
methods, while adopting a critical perspective on the role o f power in determining and
shaping corporate culture. She conducted a field study o f a Fortune 500 company,
pseudonym Hephaestus Corporation, wherein she utilized participant observation
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techniques over the course o f an academic year, while also conducting 60 in-depth 
interviews with employees and some spouses.
In her findings, she saw the rise o f  a new corporate culture, characterized by the 
rhetoric o f team and family. The aims o f the new organizational culture are to “promote 
an employee who enthusiastically manifests the values o f dedication, loyalty, self- 
sacrifice, and passion for the product and the customer.” This entails working long hours 
and declarations of commitment to the organization. Through socialization techniques 
and disciplinary measures, the new cultural message is disseminated. Those who are not 
convinced or converted are urged to leave the company. The constant reminder o f 
‘appropriate’ behavior has caused consternation among many o f the employees. Casey 
(1999:167) stated:
In particular, obsessive compulsions are considered to be commonplace, “normal” 
neurotic behaviors that are freely facilitated, and expected, in the organizational 
culture. Some employees acknowledged their obsessive compulsiveness 
believing the phenomena to be individual “personality traits,” rather than 
culturally produced defenses within the workplace. These behaviors typically 
presented in minor forms such as pacing, shaking, incessant finger tapping, 
handwringing, and blurting out in meetings, to more disabling compulsive 
routinized alignment o f pens, papers, and desk items in ordered patterns, or other 
personal ritualized movements performed to diminish anxiety.
In conclusion, Casey (1999) warned that the new organizational culture will encounter
problems o f ambivalence, compliance, integration, and control. The corporate notion o f a
family will not adequately empower workers; therefore, egalitarian qualities associated
traditional notion o f family will never be achieved in the employee-corporation relation.
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How Does Organizational Culture Influence Decision making or Choices?
The previous section focused on the ways in which organizational culture 
influences organizational behavior. As noted earlier, behavior or action is distinguishable 
from decision making or processes by which choices are made. According to Simon 
(1997:72):
Choice, in so far as it is rational and cognizant o f  its objective conditions, 
involves a selection o f one alternative from among several. The alternatives 
differ with respect to the consequences that flow from them, and an analysis of 
decision-making in its objective aspects will refer primarily to these variable 
consequences o f choice.
This section will begin with a discussion o f traditional decision making theories,
followed by a critical perspective o f  decision making, concluding with examples in the
literature o f  how components o f  organizational culture (identification, autonomy, and
symbols) influence organizational decision making.
Classical economic theory and ideas o f rationalism, based on F. W. Taylor’s
notion o f scientific management, have pervaded the development o f  decision-making
theories (Hardy 1987). The influence o f  politics was largely ignored because it was
viewed as a force that undermines rationality in business (Hatch 1997). Rationalism
(Simon and March 1958; Downs 1967; Dye 1972; Simon 1997; Hatch 1997), ‘bounded
rationality’ (Simon 1997), incrementalism (Lindblom 1959), and group theory or the
coalitional model (Cyert and March 1963; Dye 1972; Hatch 1997), have all been
instrumental in guiding public policy since the formation o f the United States.
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Theories of Decision Making
Rationalism is identified with a scientific or economic approach to analyzing and 
solving problems. According to Dye (1972:27), “a rational policy is one which is 
correctly designed to maximize ‘net value achievement.’ ” Net value achievement 
assumes that all values o f society are known and measurable and that sacrificing any one 
value will be compensated for by the attainment o f other values. March and Simon 
(1958:137) described the concept o f  rationality when they stated, “The rational man of 
economics and statistical decision theory makes “optimal” choices in a highly specified 
and clearly defined environment.” March and Simon (1958) also identified four 
components o f rationality: 1) alternatives are developed from which a decision will be 
made; 2) each alternative has a set o f  consequences based on certainty, risk, and 
uncertainty; 3) the decision maker identifies preferences from most to least preferred; and 
4) the decision maker selects the alternative leading to a preferred set o f consequences.
Downs (1967) premised his discussion o f administrative decision making on the 
rational model, wherein bureaucratic officials are motivated by their own self interest. 
Three components comprise this model: 1) officials seek to attain their goals rationally, 
focusing on efficiency; 2) officials have a complex set o f goals motivated by self interest; 
and 3) organization’s social functions strongly influence its structure and behavior 
(Downs 1967:2). Rational analysis provides a systematic firamework for making 
decisions according to standards o f  logic and consistency.
In their critique o f the rational model, March and Simon (1958), Dye (1972), 
Simon (1997), and Downs (1967) listed numerous obstacles to rational policy making 
with only a few being mentioned here: 1) there are no universally agreed upon societal
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
values, only conflicting interests; 2) the many conflicting values cannot be compared or 
weighted; 3) it is impossible to accurately weigh many societal values, especially those 
values which have no active or powerful proponents; 4) information is incomplete; 5) 
time available for decision-making processes is limited; 6) problems are extremely 
complex; 7) policy makers have little incentive to maximize societal goals, and instead 
seek to maximize their own rewards; and 8) policy makers are not motivated to maximize 
net goal achievement, but merely to satisfy demands for progress. In their critique o f the 
rational model, March and Simon (1958) acknowledged the existence o f conflict; 
however, they viewed it as a breakdown in the decision making process.
Due to the limitations o f  the rational model o f  decision making, Simon (1997) 
proposed an alternate model titled ‘bounded rationality,’ wherein administrators 
‘satisfice’ because they do not have the ‘w it’ to maximize. Examples o f satisficing 
criteria include statements such as: “share o f  the market,” “reasonable profit,” and “fair 
market value.” Whereas the rational, economic man purports to work in the real world, 
the administrative man works in the perceived world with limited resources and 
information. According to Simon (1997:119), “Because administrators satisfice rather 
than maximize, they can choose without first examining all possible behavior alternatives 
and without ascertaining that these are in fact all the alternatives.”
Incrementalism, first introduced by economist Charles Lindblom in 1959, views 
public policy and planning as continuation o f past government policies with only 
incremental modifications (Dye 1972). Today, many people call this approach “adaptive 
management” (Lee 1993). According to Lindblom (1959), decision makers do not 
annually review the full range o f options for achieving societal goals as the rational
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model would demand, but instead decision makers are constrained by time, budgets, and 
data in identifying alternatives to address societal goals. Dye (1972) stated, “The 
incremental model recognizes the impractical nature o f ‘rational-comprehensive’ policy 
making, and describes a more conservative process o f  decision making.” Dye (1972:31) 
lists four main reasons for the prominence o f  incrementalism in public policy: 1) 
agencies lack the time, intelligence, or money to investigate all alternatives to existing 
policy; 2) policy makers accept the legitimacy o f previous policies; 3) there may be large 
investments in current policies (sunk costs) which prevent any substantial change; and 4) 
it is politically expedient — agreement comes easier in decision making when discussion 
revolves around modifications to existing programs an not radical changes.
Madison (1961) first introduced group theory in Federalist Paper No. 10. He 
warned o f factions, and espoused the necessity o f a vast frontier in which competing 
interests could balance themselves out through a system o f checks and balances. Cyert 
and M arch (1963) built on the work o f March and Simon (1958) when developing the 
coalitional model o f decision making. To Cyert and March, decision making was a 
political process built on a theory o f search and choice in the face o f uncertainty and 
complexity. Whereas March and Simon (1958) viewed conflict as a breakdown in the 
decision-making process, Cyert and March (1963) viewed conflict as a result o f 
competing interest groups that arise out o f the division o f labor. Coalitions o f interest 
groups form together to realize their goals o f  acquiring or preserving scarce resources.
Dye (1972:23), summed up the coalitional model when he stated, “Group theory 
begins with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central fact o f politics. 
Individuals with common interests ban together formally or informally to press their
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demands upon government.” Accordingly, public policy is the equilibrium achieved by 
the influence o f competing interest groups. Changes in the influences o f  interest groups 
will result in shifts in public policy (Dye 1972).
Power and Politics
Whereas Cyert and March (1963) acknowledged the role o f  politics in decision 
making, they have been criticized for failing to address the nature o f  political processes 
and sources o f  power (Pettigrew 1973; Hardy 1987). Just as the functionalist paradigm 
was critiqued in the study o f organizational culture, critical theorists have also taken it 
upon themselves to identify the role o f power and politics in decision-making processes. 
According to Hatch (1987) and Pettigrew (1973), organizational decision making is 
fundamentally pluralistic activity comprised o f factions and subcultures negotiating and 
renegotiating in a never-ending stream of political haranguing.
Power is a key component o f these negotiations and is defined as the ability o f 
one person to influence someone else to do something that they would not otherwise do. 
Power is usually legitimized through authority and structure and can be manifested in 
symbols or artifacts (i.e., titles, office size or structure, salaries, or parking spaces).
Power is developed by the following activities: 1) creating dependence in others; 2) 
coping with uncertainty on behalf o f others; 3) developing personal networks; and 4) 
developing and constantly augmenting your expertise. Additionally, power is used to: 1) 
control information flows to others; 2) control agendas; 3) create legitimacy for positions 
and actions (Hardy 1987); 4) control decision-making criteria; 5) cooptation and coalition 
building; and 6) bring in outside experts to bolster your position (Hatch 1997). Pettigrew
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(1973), Hardy (1987), and Hatch (1997) note that political influences and power are 
likely to be exerted when uncertainty exists due to changing traditional patterns o f 
resource use, or when resources become scarce. According to strategic contingencies 
theory, power derives from the ability to produce something that is highly valued, like a 
critical resource. However, power is not necessarily produced from uncertainty, but 
instead from the coping mechanisms [prevention, forecasting  (providing information), or 
absorption (taking action after the event to limit negative consequences], or lack thereof, 
employed by the organization.
Stone (1997) offers her own critique o f the rational or market decision-making 
model and proposes a polis model in its place. Stone (1997:17) argued that the market 
model, “a social system in which individuals pursue their own welfare by exchanging 
things with others whenever trades are mutually beneficial,” is insufficient for describing 
political decision making that occurs in the social world. According to Stone (1997:32), 
the polis entails the following: 1) it is a community distinct from individual goals and 
behavior; 2) it has a public interest; 3) most o f  the policy problems are commons 
problems; 4) influence is pervasive and the boundary between influence and coercion is 
always contested; 5) cooperation is as important as competition; 6) loyalty is the norm; 7) 
groups and organizations are the building blocks, so accordingly the whole is greater than 
the sum o f  its parts; 8) information is interpretive, incomplete, and strategic; and 9) it is 
governed by the laws o f  passion (resources renewable) as well as the laws o f matter 
(resources are finite). The polis model is contrasted with the market model, which 
focuses on the individual as the unit o f analysis, wherein motivation to maximize self
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interest is achieved through production, competition, and utilization o f complete 
information.
Influence o f Culture on Decision Making
Earlier, Schein’s (1992) model o f cultural analysis was discussed. The model 
included three levels o f culture: artifacts or symbols (physical, behavioral, and verbal), 
espoused values (strategies, goals, philosophies), and assumptions (unconscious beliefs). 
This model will used to describe the influence o f  organizational culture on decision 
making. Assumptions have not been documented widely in the literature due to their 
difficulty to assess; however, the role that artifacts and espoused values play on 
influencing decision making has been documented. For the purpose o f this paper, the 
term identification will be used as a surrogate to study espoused values, while 
administrative rule-making (autonomy exercised as a ceremony) and the role o f  symbols 
will be used to assess the impact o f  artifacts on organizational decision making.
Identiflcation as Espoused Values
March and Simon (1958:65) introduced their notion o f identification in 1958:
Humans, in contrast to machines, evaluate their own positions in relation to the 
value o f  others and come to accept others’ goals as their own. In addition, 
individual members o f  an organization come to it with a prior structure o f  
preferences — a personality, if  you like — on the basis o f which they make 
decisions while in the organization. Thus, individual goals are not “given” for the 
organization, but can be varied both through recruitment procedures and through 
organizational practice.
Working from their initial definition, March and Simon developed a typology o f
identifications: 1) extra-organizational identification; 2) organizational identification; 3)
task identification; and 4) subgroup or subculture identification. According to March and
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Simon (1958:65), “The stronger the individuars identification with a group, the more 
likely that his goals will conform to his perception o f  group norms.” This premise was 
key to the development o f five basic factors influencing group identification (Figure 4): 
1) the greater the perceived prestige o f the group, the stronger the propensity o f an 
individual to identify with it; 2) the greater the extent to which goals are perceived as 
shared among members o f a group, the stronger the propensity o f the individual to 
identify vyith the group; 3) the more frequent the interaction between an individual and 
the members o f a group, the stronger the propensity o f  the individual to identify with the 
group; 4) the greater the number o f  individual needs satisfied in the group, the stronger 
the propensity o f  the individual to identify with the group; and 5) the less the amount o f 
competition between the members o f  a group and an individual, the stronger the 
propensity o f  the individual to identify with the group.
Figure 4. Basic Factors Affecting Group Identification (March and Simon 1958)
Frequency o f  
interaction
Perceived 
prestige o f  the 
group
Strength o f  
identification 
with the group
Number o f  
individual needs 
satisfied in the 
group
Amount o f  
competition
Extent to which 
goals are 
perceived as 
shared
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Robbins (1996:431) defined identity as “the degree to which members identify 
with the organization rather than their particular work group o f field o f professional 
expertise.” Identity has also been defined in the literature as commitment or loyalty. As 
defined, identity has both an organizational and professional component. Hall et al. 
(1970) defined organizational identification as “the process by which the goals o f the 
organization and those o f the individual become increasingly integrated or congruent.” 
Research has shown relationships between organizational identification and tenure and 
fulfillment o f higher-order needs (self fulfillment, autonomy, job challenge) (Hall et al. 
1970; Hall and Schneider 1972). Lee (1971) challenged March and Simon’s (1958) 
premise that organizational identification o f  scientists was related to the prestige o f  the 
organization. Instead, Lee found that organizational identification o f scientists is more 
closely related to general satisfaction with the job, organization, and profession.
Simon (1997:284) defined organizational identification with the context of 
decision making: “a person identifies him self with a group when, in making a decision, 
he evaluated the several alternatives o f choice in terms o f their consequences for the 
specified group.” Simon (1997) noted that the individual’s identification may be with the 
objectives o f the organization or the conservation o f  the organization itself. Downs 
(1967) developed a typology o f officials based on behaviors aimed at conserving the 
organization. This typology is similar to, but more detailed than Simon’s (1997) 
discussion o f individual identification.
Downs (1967) identified five types o f bureaucratic officials: 1) climbers, 2) 
conservers, 3) advocates, 4) statesmen and 5) zealots. Climbers are motivated by a desire 
to maximize their self-interest through promotion, aggrandizement, and jumping (leaving
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for another organization). Conservers are similar to the individual described by Simon 
(1997) (who identifies with conservation o f  the organization), and they seek to maximize 
security and convenience. Conservers tend to prefer the status quo and oppose change as 
a result o f diminished expectations, usually related to tenure, or other personal traits. 
Advocates, much like Simon’s individual who identifies with the objectives o f the 
organization, act in pursuit o f the public interest in an altruistic fashion, when it is aligned 
with organizational goals. Advocates also tend to act highly partisan externally, while 
acting impartially internally (within the organization). Statesmen are similar to 
advocates; however, their promotion o f the public interest is more broad and related to 
ideals that may not necessarily be aligned with the organization. Loyalty to the nation or 
society as a whole is paramount. Finally, zealots act to promote the public interest 
regardless o f the resistance that they may face within the organization. Zealots tend to 
have a very narrow focus o f interest and often fail to see the larger picture. Typically, 
zealots vehemently oppose the status quo and act as antagonists toward the conservers.
Cheney (1983b:342), following from the work o f Simon and Kenneth Burke, 
defined identification as “an active process by which individuals link themselves to 
elements in the social scene.” As such, identification has been linked to job motivation, 
job satisfaction, commitment, decision making, conflict resolution, employee interaction, 
tenure, work socialization, recruitment and selection o f  personnel, promotion, 
communication, public relations and rhetoric (Buchanan 1974a, 1974b; Cheney 1983a, 
1983b; Glisson and Durick 1988; Cheney and Christensen 2001). Cheney (1983a: 146- 
147) in pointing out the role o f  that rhetoric plays in developing and transmitting 
corporate identities warned:
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Simply put, an individual who is inclined to identify with an organization (or an 
organizational subunit) will be open to persuasive efforts from various sources 
within that unit. The organization “initiates” this inducement process by 
communicating its values, goals, and information (i.e., the organization’s own 
stated “identifications”) in the form o f guidelines for individual and collective 
action; the member may then “complete” the process by adopting or adapting the 
organization’s interests, doing “what’s best” for the organization, and perhaps 
even developing a salient identification within the organization as a target.
Cheney (1983b:346) also elaborated on Simon’s (1997) discussion o f the role o f
identification on decision making when he stated, “A person identifies with a unit when,
in making a decision, the person in one or more o f  his/her organizational roles perceives
that unit’s values or interests as relevant in evaluating the alternatives o f choice.” In
effect, the range o f acceptable or possible alternatives as well as the ‘decision space’ is
bounded by the self interests o f the decision maker (Downs 1967) and the objectives o f
the agency and its culture (Tompkins and Cheney 1983). It is fairly evident that
organizational identity has the potential to have a large influence on organizational
decision making; however, one must not forget the influence o f professional identity on
decision-making processes also.
As was previously mentioned (March and Simon 1958), cultural identification has
four components: extra-organizational, organizational, task, and subgroup (professional).
For the purposes of this discussion, subgroup or professional identity will be examined
along with organizational identity. Professional identity is the degree to which an
individual identifies with their profession more so than the organization. Using Downs’
typology o f officials, either zealots or climbers (expressing/Mwp/rtg behaviors, i.e., free
agency) would likely have a stronger allegiance to their profession than the organization.
Typically, organizations comprised o f individuals with strong professional loyalty or
identities tend to have a weak organizational culture, characterized by low sharedness
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(Robbins 1986). Occupational title, ideology, job  challenge, multi-organization career
systems (R&D, high tech firms) and advanced levels o f  education have been linked with
high levels o f professional identity (Becker and Carper 1956; Glaser 1964; Hall and
Schneider 1972). Jabes and Zussman (1989) have noted a general trend toward
professional identity away from organizational identity. Along those lines, they
discovered that public sector employees were more likely to have more loyalty to their
profession than private employees, who were more likely to have higher degrees o f
organizational identity. While some (Bullis and Tompkins 1989) have lauded increased
professional identities and weaker organizational cultures, others like the U.S. Armed
Forces have tried to combat all-time levels o f attrition (FY94-FY98 — 36.9%) due to
decreased organizational identification (U.S. GAO 2000b, 2000c).
Simon (1997), Cheney (1983), Tompkins and Cheney (1983) have offered
theoretical perspectives on how organizational identity influences agency decision
making. Kaufinan’s (1960) seminal work, The Forest Ranger, and subsequent research
(Hall et al. 1970; Hall and Schneider 1972; Cheney 1983; Bullis and Tompkins 1989;
Tipple and Wellman 1991; and Mohai and Jakes 1996) provide excellent natural resource
case studies to support previous theoretical ideas. Kauftnan (1960) set out to study how
the forest rangers at the local level carried out the management o f  the national forests.
Kaufman (1960:vi) stated:
In the management o f  natural resources, it is the man on the ground who actually 
carries out the program. This is equally true for private and public organizations. 
It is what he does, not what the department secretary, bureau chief, or company 
president says, that actually makes the program.
In his study, Kaufman (1960) identified multiple mechanisms aimed at promoting and
building organizational identification: 1) discouraging deviation through inspections; 2)
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recruitment and selection -  ninety percent o f  professional positions within the agency
were foresters at the time o f Kaufman’s study (Tipple and Wellman 1991); 3) use of
training and manuals; 4) promotion and transfer; 5) use o f symbols; and 6)
communications between the field and headquarters. Kaufman concluded that the Forest
Service had a high degree o f unity or strong culture. Kaufman (1960; 197), as cited in
Cheney (1983:345), described this strong culture as follows:
Much that happens to a professional forester in the Forest Service thus tends to 
tighten the links binding him to the organization. His experiences and his 
environment gradually infuse into him a view o f the world and a hierarchy o f 
preferences coinciding with those o f his colleagues. They tie him to his fellows, 
to the agency. They engender a “militant and corporate spirit,” and organized 
“self-consciousness,” dedication to the organization and its objectives, and a 
fierce pride in the Service. They practically merge the individual’s identity with 
the identity o f  the organization; the organization is as much a part o f the members 
as they are o f it.
Jack Ward Thomas (2000:10), former Chief o f the Forest Service from 1992 till 1996,
echoed the findings o f strong organizational identification in Kaufman’s study:
I admittedly begin and end with a strong bias. I believe that the Forest Service -  
warts and all -  is the best conservation organization in the world. The people of 
the past and present Forest Service have made it so. I came to the agency thirty- 
three years ago after ten years with a state wildlife agency because I simply 
wanted to be part o f the Forest Service -  part o f something bigger than m yself and 
an agency that set standards for the world.
Several studies (Bullis and Tompkins 1989; Tipple and Wellman 1991; Mohai 
and Jakes 1996) have revisited Kaufman’s (1960) original study. These authors have 
shown that the strong culture that pervaded the Forest Service in the first half o f the 
century has slowly diminished. Bullis and Tompkins (1989:297) argued, “The 
overwhelming trend has been a decline in these unobtrusive control practices which 
encourage the strong identification o f members with the organization.” This in large part 
has been attributed to changes in societal values that have been reflected in legislation
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aimed at protecting natural resources and well as legislation aimed at promoting diversity
in the workplace. Tipple and Wellman (1991:424) stated, “Thus a departure from
homogeneity o f staffing, an internal phenomenon that Kaufman described, was brought
on by changes in the external environment.” The homogeneity that once pervaded the
Forest Service no longer exists. The emphasis on diversity mentioned previously has
increased the percentage o f women, minorities, and specialists (i.e., biologists) in the
agency so much that foresters are now in the minority (Tipple and Wellman 1991). This
diversity has facilitated the promotion o f biologists (Thomas and Dombeck) to the
C h iefs  position in 1992 and 1997, which in turn has impacted the culture o f the
organization and subsequent decision making.
Bullis and Tompkins (1989) noted that many veteran employees long for the
strong organizational culture o f  the past, with one individual going so far to equate
working for the Forest Service as a “calling.” However, the researchers are not
persuaded by this longing for strong identification and welcome the diminishment of the
culture of years past;
.. .concertive control, or strong culture should be approached with caution. While 
we are sympathetic to the nostalgia expressed by employees for the identities and 
identification o f the past, the homogeneity o f  that “strong” culture made the 
organization less flexible and adaptive to the changes in the environment. .. .The 
heterogeneity o f the current “weak” culture is no doubt more flexible, more 
adaptive in relation to its environment — including the political climate and its 
inevitable fluctuations. Strong culture, then, may create inflexibility as members 
think in concert (Bullis and Tompkins 1989:304).
Whereas Bullis and Tompkins laud the retreating strong culture o f the Forest 
Service as an opportunity for flexibility, caution should be exercised because it is an 
active ingredient for gridlock that permeates the agency (Lowi 1969; Wondolleck 1988; 
U.S. GAO 1997a). The weak organizational culture o f the Forest Service appears to rely
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on pluralistic decision-making processes driven by interest groups competing for scarce 
resources (environmental values, goods, services, and justice) and power. This unto 
itself would not be problematic, were it not for the rational decision-making framework 
that is currently mandated in statute and utilized by federal agencies. The foundation of 
environmental laws [National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Endangered Species 
Act], and the judicial system set to inteipret them, are both predicated upon facts and 
expert witnesses and fail to adequately weigh the values and preferences o f  the 
competing interest groups. NEPA is patterned after the rational model o f decision 
making steeped in traditional economic theory and requires agencies to develop a range 
o f acceptable alternatives to meet preordained goals and objectives. There is a 
presumption that a scientifically defensible alternative should be selected that maximizes 
one objective against resource constraints. The mantra o f scientific management and 
decision making originated in the Progressive Era and was espoused by Gifford Pinchot, 
the first Chief o f the Forest Service. Fairfax (2005) recognized the Progressive Era 
cultural trappings faced by the Forest Service and called for its and the National Park 
Service’s assimilation into the Bureau o f Land Management. As the Forest Service has 
internally diversified its values and recruitment o f  employees, in effect changing its 
culture, much o f this has been without the consent o f  Congress (U.S. GAO 1997a, 1997b, 
2000a; Sedjo 2000; Hoberg 2001). This is due largely to the discretion that has been 
afforded to the agency by Congress.
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Administrative Rule-Making as a Ceremonial Artifact: Autonomy Exercised
Robbins (1996:431) defined autonomy as “the degree o f responsibility, 
independence, and opportunities for exercising initiative that individuals in the 
organization have.” Autonomy, like identity can be viewed at multiple levels (i.e., 
individual, bureau within an organization, organization under the executive branch and so 
on). While reflecting on the importance o f autonomy for a bureau within an organization. 
Downs (1967:7) had this comment, “No bureau can survive unless it is continually able 
to demonstrate that its services are worthwhile to some group with influence over 
sufficient resources to keep it alive.” Even though Downs was referring to a bureau, the 
same could be said o f the individual. Each individual wants enough autonomy to 
demonstrate that he is worthwhile in the eyes o f the agency. According to Simon 
(1997:310), “The broader the sphere o f  discretion left to the subordinate, the more 
important become those types o f influence which do not depend upon the exercise o f  
formal authority.” Greater levels o f autonomy afford individuals more discretion when 
evaluating alternatives and making decisions based on their own values and 
preconceptions within the overall sideboards o f the organization. Administrative rule- 
making is a specific example o f where autonomy or discretion can have significant 
impacts on the organization’s ability to meet its objectives.
Federal and state administrative procedures acts provide procedures for agencies 
to interpret laws passed by Congress or state legislatures. West (1982:420) defined 
rulemaking as, “the exercise o f  legislative authority which has been delegated from 
Congress to an agency.” It is not uncommon for laws to be vague and open to various
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interpretations; therefore when agencies undertake a rule-making effort, they are afforded 
discretion to interpret legislative intent. Pending the level o f  autonomy delegated by 
higher authorities, the potential exists for individuals in an organization to have varying 
levels o f influence in how laws are interpreted and eventually implemented on the 
ground. It m ust also be noted the rulemaking is inherently a political process (West 
1982). Calls for autonomy are typically advocated by politicians and organizations alike, 
to allow for local solutions to local problems. The idea is that decisions made at local 
levels will foster and incorporate citizen input at higher levels than if  decisions are made 
at national levels. In an effort to show how autonomy has influenced decision making 
examples from the Federal Trade Commission and the Forest Service will be discussed.
West (1982) documented the role that politics and organizational culture had on 
the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) ability to promulgate Trade Regulation Rules 
(TRR). The two primary missions o f the FTC are antitrust enforcement and consumer 
protection. Agency personnel took their commitment to consumer protection seriously.
In an effort to curb deception in the market place, the FTC regularly issued consent 
orders, advisory opinions, and consumer guides. Until 1962, the FTC relied primarily on 
adjudication when attempting to protect individuals and industry from deceptive 
marketplace practices. However, in 1962 to the dismay of industry and some members of 
Congress, the FTC decided to promulgate TRR as a means to more effectively police the 
entire industry. The impetus for rule-making at this time was attributed to a wave o f 
consumerism evident within and outside o f the organization.
The first consequence o f rule-making was that cigarette companies had to put 
warning labels on their products. Thirty years o f adjudication could not accomplish what
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one year o f  rule-making could. The backlash from the cigarette industry and Congress
was so strong that the new rule was nullified by a statute, and the FTC was forbidden to
promulgate new cigarette rules for four years. West (1982:422) stated:
The reaction by cigarette manufacturers and tobacco grower [to the health 
regulation] was so formidable that Congress soon enacted a statute which 
nullified the regulation.... Congress’s lack o f support “burned” the commission 
deeply, and as a result, the agency reverted to the issuance o f trivial rules.
Public outrage, initiated by Ralph Nader, coupled with internal frustration over
Congress’s actions, led to further activism by the FTC in the late 1960s and 1970s. This
renewed vigor toward consumer protection was met with challenges from the regulated
industry. Questions o f authority were common, with the FTC going as far as petitioning
Congress to amend the FTC Act to include a specific grant o f  rule-making authority.
This authority was granted in the Magnuson-Moss Act o f  1974, and was hailed by
consumer protection groups and the FTC alike.
West (1982) concluded:
In general, the FTC’s case history illustrates the political costs inherent in a 
mlemaking approach within a conflictual environment, and suggests why other 
agencies may be reluctant to issue rules under analogous conditions. .. .The 
commission’s experience also suggests, albeit indirectly, that a harmonious 
environment and the existence o f concrete goals in an agency’s enabling 
legislation. The irony o f  this latter observation is that vague statutory policy 
makes rulemaking both more desirable from an administrative perspective and 
less feasible within the context o f  bureaucratic politics.
The Forest Service would have done well to have heeded W est’s (1982) observations
regarding rulemaking and its political consequences.
Kaufman (1960) described the Forest Service as a decentralized agency that
enabled rangers to feel as if  they had a high degree o f  discretion at the local level.
According to Tipple and Wellman (1991:422), “In doing so, the rangers felt as thought
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they were exercising large amounts o f discretion, yet their actions were generally
pleasing to the organization. Hence a mythology o f decentralization prevailed.”
Kaufman (1960:222) described this myth o f discretion as voluntary conformity:
...the techniques o f  integration earlier identified as developing the will and the 
capacity to conform are positive as well as negative in effect. They do more than 
elicit reluctant obedience. They do more than persuade each R m ger to assign 
higher priorities to the wishes o f  the organization than to his own. They actually 
infuse into the forest officers the desired patterns o f  action in the management of 
their districts, so that the Rangers handle most situations precisely as their 
superiors would direct them to if  their superiors stood looking over their 
shoulders, supervising every detail. To overstate the case, their decisions are 
predetermined. From the Rangers’ point o f view, they are not obeying orders or 
responding to cues when they take action on their districts; they are exercising 
their own initiative.
This notion o f voluntary conformity ensured that decisions made at the local level were 
consistent with views within higher levels o f the organization. While autonomy has been 
delegated within the Forest Service, delegation o f authority has also occurred from 
Congress to the agencies.
Hoberg (2001 ) noted that the agency regulations implementing the National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA), and promulgated under the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA), were much more stringent than the original language in the NFMA. Whereas 
the NFMA [16 U.S.C. sec 1604(g)(3)(B)] mentions the need to provide for a diversity o f 
plant and animal communities, the Forest Service’s regulations require that they manage 
to maintain ‘viable populations’ o f  vertebrate species. This subtle change has proven 
very problematic with the courts (what constitutes a viable population?), with timber 
management stalled in the Pacific Northwest over this clause as it pertained to spotted 
owls. Amendments later proposed in Congress to ensure greater consistency between the
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NFM A and its regulations, with their species viability clause, were defeated by Congress 
(Hoberg 2001).
Another more recent example o f agency discretion expressed through rule making
is the new Forest Service Planning Regulations. Once again, the Forest Service has
promulgated rules that go beyond the letter o f the NFMA. The new Planning Regulations
elevate ‘ecological sustainability’ as the Forest Service’s highest mission, yet this is not
codified in law (Hoberg 2001). The GAO (2000a:6) recently reported:
Although the Forest Service’s 1999 proposed planning regulations would make 
ecological sustainability, rather than economic or social sustainability, the 
agency’s top priority, the priority assigned to ecological sustainability is not 
driven by the statutory authorities specific to the management o f the national 
forests. These authorities provide little direction for the agency in resolving 
conflicts among competing uses on its lands. Rather, the priority assigned to 
ecological sustainability is predicated on the requirements in environmental laws 
— enacted primarily during the 1960s and 1970s — and their implementing 
regulations and judicial interpretations. These laws reflect changing public values 
and concerns about the management o f  the national forests as well as increased 
scientific understanding o f the functioning o f ecological components.
Whereas the GAO recognizes the role o f  changing values influencing
environmental laws, they are silent as to the impact that changing organizational culture
has had on Forest Service values. Why would Forest Service officials propose
regulations deemed more conservative than the laws themselves, unless they were not
exercising their own discretion within a changing culture influenced by a new identity
(Simon 1997)? The increased diversity (i.e., biologists, hydrologists, etc.) in the
organization, at lower and upper levels o f  the agency has resulted in more protections for
the environment and lower levels o f resource extraction as exercised through discretion.
Jack Ward Thomas (1997), wildlife biologist and former Chief o f  the Forest Service, as
cited in Sedjo (2000:177) exemplified this point in testimony before Congress:
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It is not widely recognized -  much less openly acknowledged -  but public land 
managers now have one overriding objective (or constraint) for management -  the 
preservation o f biodiversity. .. .The law does not clearly say [the Forest Service 
should manage for the preservation o f biodiversity]. Nobody seems to openly 
recognize it. . I don’t personally have an objection to [managing for 
biodiversity] — if  that is what society wants.
Thomas is quoted as saying that he would manage for biodiversity if  society wanted it,
but underneath that, he is implying that he would manage for biodiversity because it is
the right thing to do from a wildlife biologist’s perspective, and from a perspective o f his
agency that shares his professional bias.
Symbols as Artifacts
One final notable expression or manifestation o f organization culture that
influences organizational decision making are symbols. Symbols are defined as social
objects, including but not limited to language, acts, and gestures (Charon 1979).
According to Charon (1979:39), “symbols are one class o f social objects.” For Blumer
(1969:11), “ .. an object is anything that can be indicated or referred to.” Symbols are
used by people to represent different things. Symbols are conventional, meaningful,
arbitrary, and are expressed as words/language, acts/gestures, and social objects (Charon
1979). Trice and Beyer (1984:655) defined symbol “as any object, act, event, quality or
relation that serves as a vehicle for conveying meaning, usually by representing another
thing.” Ott (1989:21) further defined symbols as:
... signs that connote meanings greater than themselves and express much more 
than their intrinsic content. They are invested with specific subjective meanings. 
Symbols embody and represent wider patterns o f meaning and cause people to 
associate conscious or unconscious ideas that in turn endow them with their 
deeper, fuller, and often emotion-invoking meaning.
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Defining symbol as broadly as has been above allows for most any social occurrences to 
qualify as expressions o f culture (Pacanowsky and O ’Donnell-Trujillo 1982). In an effort 
to put some boundaries on this discussion, language (expressed as mission statements), 
dress (Tipple and Wellman 1991), and rituals (Trice and Beyer 1984) will be used as 
examples that influence decision making.
Language
Burke (1970) provided a taxonomy o f words/language that is useful in describing 
how language, particularly rhetoric, influences decision making in natural resources. The 
1897 Organic Act created the Forest Reserves and enunciated the mission o f the Forest 
Service: 1) to preserve and protect the forest within the reservation; 2) to secure 
favorable conditions o f water flows; and 3) to furnish a continuous supply o f timber for 
the use and necessities o f  the people o f  the United States. Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief 
o f  the Forest Service was an avowed utilitarian and conservationist. Pinchot modified 
Jeremy Bentham’s definition o f utility, “the greatest happiness o f the greatest number 
that is the measure o f  right and wrong,” as his philosophy/interpretation for how the 
forest reserves should be managed to provide “the greatest good for the greatest number 
in the long term.” The passage o f the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY) in 1960 
elaborated on the mission o f the Forest Service by adding the management o f outdoor 
recreation, wildlife and fish, wilderness, and grazing to their responsibilities. Pinchot’s 
utilitarian rhetoric, which emphasized the role o f science and efficiency in a rational 
decision making model, would set the standard for how decisions would be made 
regarding the management o f the forest reserves up until 1973 with the passage o f the
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Endangered Species Act (ESA) (Hays 1959). Until the passage o f the ESA, efficiency 
and economy were the two top priorities for the Forest Service, thus effectuating 
decisions that favored timber harvest and grazing over other resource uses or non-uses 
(wildlife, water, wilderness). Tipple and Wellman (1991:425) noted that since 1973, the 
values o f the agency are now more reflective o f  responsiveness and representativeness to 
public and internal environmental concerns than previous values associated with 
efficiency and economy. This is due in part to public pressure and changing rhetoric 
from within the Forest Service as advocated by two previous Chiefs (biologists) who 
served from 1992-2001 and valued preservation o f biodiversity and protection o f 
watersheds through reclamation o f  roads.
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Dress
Kauünan (1960) described the use o f uniforms and badges to heighten the sense 
o f identification within the Forest Service. Kaufman (1960:184) stated, “The whole 
purpose o f uniforms and badges is to identify the members o f organizations, to 
differentiate the wearers from everyone else and to link them with each other.” Kaufman 
(1960) noted that not all employees viewed the importance o f wearing the uniform 
equally; however, the use o f  agency symbols (uniforms) serves to promote agency 
awareness and ultimately identification. According to Bullis and Tompkins (1989:297), 
the use o f  symbols within the Forest Service has declined with fewer uniform allowances 
and less distinctive office buildings. As such, “Forest Service employees might never be 
identified by community members as such....” The decreased use o f  uniforms further 
weakens the agency culture, contributing to greater personal identification and less 
organizational identification and decisions more aligned with personal goals rather than 
agency goals.
Rituals
Trice and Beyer (1984) presented a typology o f rites (passage, degradation, 
enhancement, renewal, conflict reduction, and integration). Kaufman (1960) discussed 
techniques for integration o f newcomers into the Forest Service. The Forest Service used 
numerous techniques or rituals to foster a strong organizational culture. An integration 
ritual involved use o f the Forest Service Manual, which was and still serves as a guideline 
for performing duties. Another integration ritual was post-entry training. This training 
was designed to socialize employees to ensure that they would think and act like others in
65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the organization, in effect preforming the decision space. Movement o f personnel was a 
renewal ritual designed to enhance agency identification, similarly to the military. 
Employees would ideally identify with the Service first and their unit or district secondly. 
Improved communication has also changed the rituals for resolving disputes. Whereas 
Kaufman (1960) noted that disputes (rituals o f conflict reduction) were often resolved at 
local ranger districts with rubber stamping by higher officials, today those higher officials 
at the regional levels are more involved in the formation o f decisions. Bullis and 
Tompkins (1989:294) reported, “The ‘onslaught o f  the public’ as well as better 
communication technology changed decision making so that the regional office and the 
public have more power than the ranger.”
Conclusion
Studies o f organizational culture have evolved as both a recognition and rejection 
o f the functionalist paradigm o f  science. Corporate culture studies have tended to view 
culture as something that an organization ‘has’ that can and should be managed or 
changed to achieve the goals o f  the organization. Organizational culture studies have 
viewed culture as something that is’, which cannot necessarily be managed. Studies of 
organizational culture have become overly concerned with the implications o f  managing 
for a ‘strong’ corporate culture, wherein the rhetoric o f teamwork and family is used in 
pursuit o f profit to the exclusion o f  societal values. The same critical theorist critique has 
dominated the decision making literature. Theories o f  politics and power have been 
advocated as rationale for explaining human behavior and decisions instead o f traditional 
economic theory predicated on maximization o f self interest.
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Regardless o f one’s personal paradigmatic bias, I have tried to show that 
organizational culture through its manifestations in artifacts (symbols, reorganizations, 
risk tolerance, performance appraisals, autonomy, rituals, ceremonies, language, dress), 
espoused values (identification), and assumptions (underlying beliefs), has directly 
influenced organizational behavior and decision making. The culture o f an organization 
frames the setting for action and choice by defining appropriate behavior, limiting the 
range o f selectable alternatives, transmitting symbols, and enforcing behavior with 
rewards or punishment as appropriate.
Studies o f early organizational culture were decried as faddish; however, 
organizational culture has endured and firmly rooted itself within the discourse of 
organizational theory. The future o f organizational cultural studies is uncertain. Whereas 
studies o f corporate culture dominated the 1980s, critical perspectives focusing on the 
role o f power in culture appear to have dominated the late 1990s. Even though the 
literature predominantly argues for an interpretive framework when studying 
organizational culture, interpretive studies have tended to be more conceptual than field 
oriented. The final section will provide some recommendations for future research in the 
area o f  organizational culture and its effects on behavior and decision making.
Implications for Further Research
As was evidenced earlier in this paper, two distinct scientific paradigms dominate 
the organizational culture literature. Before proceeding with outlining a methodology, 
domain o f study, or identifying a specific organization to study, one must situate himself 
within a scientific paradigm (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Patterson and Williams 1998).
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W hen studying social phenomena, I am more persuaded by the usefulness o f the 
interpretive worldview when contrasted with the functionalist paradigm for reasons 
previously discussed. However, within the interpretive worldview, there are numerous 
social science paradigms from which to choose.
Paradigm
Bantz (1993) and Hatch (1997) suggested that symbolic interactionism (Mead 
1934; Blumer 1969; Meltzer et al. 1975; Charon 1979; and Stryker 1980) is an 
appropriate paradigm from which to study organizational communication and more 
specifically organizational culture. According to Bantz (1993:23), " ... by 
communicating, persons constitute symbolic realities.” This notion o f symbolic realities 
finds its origin in the premises o f symbolic interactionism popularized by Herbert Blumer 
(1969). According to Stryker (1980), Blumer (1969:2-5), drew on the works o f several 
authors (Dewey, Cooley, Thomas, and Mead) in laying out the three premises on which 
symbolic interactionism is founded: 1) human beings act toward things on the basis o f 
the meanings that things have for them; 2) the meaning o f such things is derived from, or 
arises out of, the social interaction, which form s  conduct, that one has with one’s fellows; 
and 3) symbolic interactionism sees meanings as social products, as creations that are 
formed in and through the defining activities o f people as they interact, which is an 
interpretive process.
Much o f the previous discussion indirectly outlines the normative commitments 
(ontology, epistemology, and axiology) o f the symbolic interactionist paradigm. The 
basic ontological assumptions o f symbolic interactionism are that there are multiple.
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socially-constructed realities. Humans interpret the world according to social definitions
(Charon 1979). Berger and Luckman (1967) (as cited in Hudson and Ozanne 1988:509)
first articulated this idea and stated, “Reality is also socially constructed in that all human
knowledge is developed, transmitted, and maintained in social situations.” According to
Blumer (1969:12-22), “Objects have no fixed status except as their meaning is sustained
through indications and definitions that people make o f the objects. .. .It is impossible to
cite a single instance o f a characterization o f the “world o f reality” that is not cast in the
form o f human imagery.” According to Peter (1992:74):
... No meaningful interpretation o f that world can be made that does not involve 
some form o f human processing, typically in the form o f symbols. .. .An 
important point o f this discussion is that even for simple objects, the labels placed 
on them and the meanings given to them are human constructions in the form of 
language, mathematics, or other symbols; they are not the objects themselves.
The basic epistemological assumptions o f symbolic interactionism are that the
knower and the known are inseparable, truth is viewed as subjective knowledge, and the
focus o f research is on the acquisition o f ideographic knowledge (motives, meanings,
reasons, and other subjective experiences that are time and context bound) (Burrell and
Morgan 1979; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Hudson and Ozanne 1988:511). For the
symbolic interactionist, the social world can only be understood from the point o f view of
the participants being studied (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Truth is considered a social
construction, or a concept designed to refer to a particular belief within a specific context
or setting. The idea that universal truth can be determined and understood independent of
human social constructions is foreign to the symbolic interactionist. Peter (1992:75)
stated, “Truth is a subjective evaluation that cannot be properly inferred outside the
context provided by the theory.”
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The primary goal o f research or axiology for the symbolic interactionist is 
understanding the processes linked to human behavior, and not predicting it. (This is in 
direct contrast to critical theory with its ideological goal o f uncovering the abuses of 
power and politics in almost any social situation.) Accordingly, interpretations are fluid 
and incomplete, never allowing one to achieve the universal understanding, but instead 
an understanding (Hudson and Ozanne 1988:510). According to Blumer (1969:21), 
“ ...[symbolic interactionism] is an approach designed to yield verifiable knowledge of 
human group life and human conduct.” The symbolic interactionist goal o f  
understanding is achieved through knowing culturally-shared meanings or Verstehen 
(Geertz 1973), as well as “identifying motives, dynamic uses o f shared meanings, 
individual meanings, and interactions between shared meanings and individual 
meanings” Hudson and Ozanne (1988:510-511).
Stryker (1980:80) graphically depicted a notion o f symbolic interactionism 
(Figure 5), which emphasizes the role that self, viewed from the outside (Mead 1934), 
plays in explaining interaction. Charon (1979:56), depicted the importance that symbols 
hold in producing society and the individual (Figure 6). According to Charon (1979:39), 
“symbols are one class o f social objects.” For Blumer (1969:11), “ ...an  object is 
anything that can be indicated or referred to.” Symbols are used by people to represent 
different things. Symbols are conventional, meaningful, arbitrary, and are expressed as 
words/language, acts/gestures, and social objects (Charon 1979).
Burke (1970:14-15) provided a typology o f words or realms to which words (symbols) 
may refer: 1) words for the natural (things); 2) words for the socio-political realm (social
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relations); 3) words about words (rhetoric/ideology); and 4) words for the supernatural.
Charon (1979:55) summarized the role that symbols play in constructing social life:
Symbolic communication with each other is the basis o f our socialization, which 
brings about a shared culture, which allows for understanding each other’s acts—  
what we do is meaningful to each other and cooperative group life is made 
possible.
Burke (1966:16) also recognized the role that symbols play in defining who man is:
Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor o f 
the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition 
by instruments o f  his own making, goaded by the spirit o f hierarchy (or moved by 
the sense o f  order), and rotten with perfection.
Figure 5.
Society
Interaction
Self Society
Figure 6.
Interaction
Sharedsymbols
Individual
Research Program
The research program refers to the specific theories or methodologies that are 
utilized to study substantive issues o f  concern (Patterson and Williams 1998). In his 
description o f appropriate methodological considerations, Blumer (1969:40-60) called for 
direct examination o f phenomena through exploration and inspection. While Blumer 
fails to provide specifics for how such methods might be conducted, others (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Geertz 1973; and Strauss and Corbin 1998) have attempted to sort this out. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) are best known for their development o f grounded theory 
through inductive methods. Geertz (1973), in intricate detail describes the art o f “thick
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description.” Strauss and Corbin (1998), under the rubric o f qualitative research attempt 
to provide a pragmatic framework for conducting the type o f research that Blumer 
envisioned.
Whereas many o f the interpretive organizational culture studies tend to be 
conceptual in nature, studies by Maynard-Moody et al, (1986) and Sackmann (1991) both 
employed ethnographic or qualitative methods to study organizational culture. Over a 6- 
month period, Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) conducted 47 interviews totaling 80 hours 
across all division o f the Kansas Department o f  Health and Environment (KDHE). The 
focus o f  their research was to research the role o f reorganization in the rise and fall o f 
dominant subcultures. Interviews were conducted with key informants and lasted 
between one and two hours. Each informant was asked a standard series o f  open-ended 
questions (Table 2) to increase comparability o f responses. Data gathering also included 
collecting memoranda, letters, documents, and reviewing annual reports dating back to 
the agency’s inception in 1885. Key informants included all o f top management, as well 
as selected individuals representing all sections o f  the department. To increase external 
validity, informants were deliberately selected for their diverse viewpoints. Most of the 
interviews were conducted at the work site. Interviewing ended when no new 
perspectives were provided (i.e., saturation had been achieved). Interviews were 
transcribed and examined for themes, which were compared across work and subcultural 
groups. Member validation o f themes and interpretations was used to increase internal 
validity.
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Table 2. Question Topics fo r  Open-Ended Interview (Maynard-Moody et al. 1986)
1. Background with state government and KDHE. What are your personal plans viz. 
KDHE? How long do you expect to work there, etc.?
2. Describe your work, what do you do, and to whom you talk and report.
3. What happened before, during, and after the reorganization?
4. Rationale(s) for the reorganization. (Probe for a variety o f reasons including 
political, managerial, personal interest, efficiency, etc.)
5. What, who, and where was the impetus for the reorganization? (External or 
internal. Role o f  the governor and the legislature.)
6. Problems encountered during the reorganization.
7. What has changed? (Probe to get as complete a list o f the changes as possible).
8. Have the rules for behavior and advancement changed with the reorganization? If 
friends o f yours had been hired by KDHE following the 1983 reorganization, 
what would you have told them? If  they had come to work here before the 
reorganization, how would your advice have differed?
9. What individuals and groups have benefited most from the reorganization?
.. .have been hurt the most?
10. If you wanted to describe to a friend the changes in KDHE, what events -  
meetings, memos, conflict, etc. — would you give as examples?
11. If you had the authority, what four policies, new or established, would you 
emphasize at KDHE?
12. In addition to the issue we have discussed, what do we need to find out to 
understand the reorganization?
13. Can you suggest other individuals with whom we should talk?
14. Are there any documents — memos, reports, etc. — that would help us to 
understand the reorganization?
Sackmann (1991:305) adopted a phenomenological orientation, wherein she
focused on insiders’ perspectives. She described the process as follows:
Rapport needs to be established initially. After a broad introduction and a 
triggering, open-ended question, which is used to tune the interviewee into the 
subject matter o f  exploration, the interviewer stays with the flow o f the 
respondent during the interview. Those facets o f the issue that are mentioned by 
respondents are explored further. This approach enables the researcher to enter 
and explore with the respondent his or her phenomenal world and the cognitive 
frameworks that come to bear, and ultimately leam the respondent’s point of 
view. The interactive process allows the researcher to check understandings 
during the exploration. To ensure that the researcher understands the phenomenal 
world o f a respondent, he or she can silently answer a posed question before the
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respondent answers. The degree o f accuracy o f such silent answers indicates the 
extent to which the researcher has established an understanding.
During the course o f the study, she conducted 52 interviews with organizational members
— including top management — across three different divisions during four different
interview stages. In an effort narrow and structure the focus o f the study, the author
identified a singular issue with which to guide the interviews. Consistent with the
phenomenological orientation, the interview began with a broad open-ended question:
“Name the three innovations at the company in the past 5 years that they considered the
most important.” In addition to that open-ended question, the researcher also addressed
the questions in Table 3 during the interview without disrupting the flow.
Table 3. Questions (Sackmann 1991)
1. Why is the mentioned innovation considered important?
2. What was the context o f  the particular innovation?
3. Who was involved at what time during the innovation process and how?
4. What caused the innovation?
5. Who and what aspects promoted the innovation?
6. Who and what aspects presented obstacles to the process and how?
7. What should/could have been done to improve the innovation?
8. What would you do differently in the future to make it better?
The data was analyzed using thematic content analyses. This involves identifying 
themes or categories from the data and interpreting meaning associated with those 
themes. The author used member validation techniques (discussions o f interpretations 
with top management) coupled with simultaneous observation o f behavior during 
interviews to validate the procedures. Reliability is difficult to ensure with qualitative 
methods; however, Sackmann (1991) used three different procedures to address this 
concern: 1) toward the end o f each interview, the researcher asked a question and posed
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a silent response — the interview continued until the silent response matched the verbal 
response indicating understanding; 2) during the analysis and interpretation stage, 
emerging themes were critically debated and discussed with two colleagues not directly 
associated with the study, yet had an understanding o f cultural studies; and 3) all 
interview data were reanalyzed within 1 month later and no significant changes were 
noticed in the second analysis.
Methodological Strengths and Weaknesses
Both studies (Maynard-Moody et al. 1986 and Sackmann 1991) adopted an 
interpretive worldview with which to study organizational culture. The strength o f this 
perspective is that it allows the researcher to understand the social phenomenon being 
studied from the perspective o f  the informant, thus allo^ving the researcher to create a 
representation o f the social event grounded within the data. This ideographic approach is 
considered to have high degrees o f  validity when techniques such as member validation 
are employed; however reliability or the ability to replicate the results is difficult given 
the subjective nature o f the investigation. Sackmann (1991) addressed reliability issues 
in her study; however, Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) failed to address them.
A limitation o f  ideographic studies is that they are not readily generalizable across 
the population. Researchers who use these methods accept these limitations up front in 
their epistemological and ontological commitments, but that does not stop nomothetic 
researchers from reminding them o f that limitation in the data. This brings up an 
interesting point in the study o f  organizational culture. Initially, it was the quantitative 
messengers o f corporate culture (Deal and Kennedy 1982) who argued that culture was a
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unitary and unique phenomena across organizations. The interpretive and critical
researchers (Martin et ai. 1983) countered that culture is not unique, but that all cultures
share common stories or metapattems (Adams and Ingersoll 1990; Adams 1993).
One other methodological issue has to deal with the unit o f analysis. According
to Hall (1987:84), “The focus on organizations as the unit o f  analysis falls squarely
within the sociological tradition.” Accordingly, organizations are realities, actors,
consequences for actions, and responders. Psychologists and those interested in studying
cognitions have tended to focus on the individual as the appropriate unit o f analysis.
Others have taken a more pluralistic view on this subject.
Early disputes about the “proper” level o f analysis -  individual, organization, or 
some intermediate unit -  have gradually given way to recognition that work at 
several levels o f analysis is not only appropriate but necessary. The organization 
as a whole cannot be understood simply by reducing it into component parts and 
studying only groups and individuals. Still, we cannot understand organizations 
without also developing useful concepts about individual and group behavior in 
organizations. (Lawrence 1987:4)
Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) initially focused on the organization as their unit of
analysis, focusing on the role that the dominant culture had on behavior. The authors
then shifted their focus to exploring the role that the reorganization had on the entire
group and its subsequent development o f  two distinct subgroups. Sackmann (1991) took
a cognitive or ideational perspective was more concerned with individual perspectives on
how innovation affected the behavior o f  the company toward employees. As I have
alluded to earlier, I tend to fall more within the behavioral camp than the ideational one,
so my preference for unit o f  analysis falls to the organization. I think Maynard-Moody’s
(1986) approach o f starting at the organizational level and working one’s way down to
subcultures is appropriate given Lawrence’s (1987) sentiments.
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Domain of Interest
I am interested in understanding the role that organizational culture plays in 
influencing trust land management decision making in Idaho and Washington. Whereas 
both states have a clear fiduciary mandate to generate revenue from their lands, I posit 
that the dominant organizational cultures in those two organizations have influenced 
management actions and decisions on-the-ground in different ways. The traditional 
ideographic view would preclude direct comparisons between the two states; however, 
the enlightened view o f culture, as sharing common stories, would allow for some 
comparisons. Adams and Ingersoll (1990) showed that the “managerial metamyth,” with 
its emphasis on efficiency and productivity is rampant across many cultures.
Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) and Sackmann (1991) provide good examples o f 
how one needs to focus the emphasis o f  their cultural study. Both authors examined the 
roles o f subcultures in understanding the influence on behavior and choices. Given that 
both the Washington Department o f Natural Resources and the Idaho Department of 
Lands have recently experienced reorganizations (artifacts), wherein new department 
directors or commissioners have either been elected or appointed, 1 expect that 
organizational and professional subcultures exist in both organizations that are currently 
being challenged. In Washington, an eight-year Democratic reign has just been 
supplanted by a Republican Land Commissioner (a newcomer), whereas in Idaho, an 
internal candidate (Republican) was appointed by the Land Board to serve as the new 
Department Director.
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As previously discussed under identification, it is expected that both professional 
and organizational subcultures exist within the agencies. Whereas the organizational 
subcultures may have common symbols (i.e., language o f efficiency), the professional 
subcultures (i.e., biologists, hydro legists, foresters, range specialists, real estate 
marketers) might provide for fruitful comparisons and development o f  ‘types’ or themes. 
Maynard-Moody and Sackmann also provide excellent examples o f types o f questions 
that are open-ended and not leading. Many times it is difficult for researchers bracket 
their beliefs and this is reflected in leading questions. Interview questions need to 
provoke thought on the part o f  the informant, but should not lead them into identifying an 
a priori bias (i.e., power) o f the researcher.
Conclusion
Studies on organizational culture within the domain o f natural resource 
management have focused exclusively on the United States Forest Service. Given the 
increased scrutiny o f  trust land management and the controversial role o f a fiduciary 
mandate in guiding management decisions, it is high time that interpretive research is 
conducted regarding the impacts that organizational culture has on trust land management 
decision making. This research would provide novel insights to current understandings 
o f trust land management (Souder and Fairfax 1996).
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